

JPRS-SEA-89-007
8 FEBRUARY 1989



JPRS Report

East Asia

Southeast Asia

East Asia Southeast Asia

JPRS-SEA-89-007

CONTENTS

8 FEBRUARY 1989

INDONESIA

- Comments on Transition to Second Generation Leaders [TEKNOLOGI & STRATEGI MILITER Jan] 1
- Strategy Proposal for Air Force Development [TEKNOLOGI & STRATEGI MILITER Jan] 2

LAOS

- Signing of Cultural Cooperation Protocol With USSR [Vientiane Radio] 4

PHILIPPINES

- Senate Hears Continuing Complaints of Extrajudicial Killings [THE MANILA CHRONICLE 19 Dec] 5
- Army Chief Reacts to Bataan Counterinsurgency Failure [THE MANILA CHRONICLE 21 Dec] 6
- Daily Analyzes Poll on NPA Popularity [THE MANILA CHRONICLE 9 Jan] 6
- Daily Analyzes Slow Pace of Privatization [THE MANILA CHRONICLE 2 Jan] 7

THAILAND

- Cabinet Approves Plans To Buy Israeli Rockets [BANGKOK POST 1 Feb] 13
- Scholars Comment on Hun Sen Visit [MATICHON 19 Jan] 13
- Delegates Block Laos-SRV Bid for Mekong Projects in PRK [THE NATION 1 Feb] 14
- Editorial Views Current Moves To Resolve Cambodian Issue [THE NATION 1 Feb] 14

VIETNAM

POLITICAL

- National Assembly Deputies Interviewed [SAIGON GIAI PHONG 9 Dec] 16
- Legal Seminar Examines Democracy, Development [SAIGON GIAI PHONG 9 Dec] 18
- Democracy Discussed at Journalists Conference [SAIGON GIAI PHONG 6 Dec] 18

MILITARY

- Export Processing Zone Project Takes Shape in HCM City [SAIGON GIAI PHONG 1 Dec] 21
- Bac Thai Combats Substandard Recruiting [QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 2 Dec] 22

ECONOMIC

- NHAN DAN Discusses New Economic Zones [NHAN DAN 24 Jan] 23

SOCIAL

- Constitution of Ministers Sets Limit of Two Children Per Family [GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 5 Dec] 25
- Cuu Long Province Tries To Settle Land Disputes [NHAN DAN 5, 6 Dec] 27

Comments on Transition to Second Generation Leaders

42130048a Jakarta TEKNOLOGI & STRATEGI MILITER in Indonesian Jan 89 pp 6-7

[Editorial: "Notes on Strategies for 1989"]

[Text] Without being aware of it, the Indonesian people will enter REPELITA [5-Year Development Plan] V, the last stage of the Long-Term Development Plan (25 years).

Coinciding with the end of REPELITA V in 1993 will be the completion of the role of the '45 Generation, now still on hand in both central and local governments. The next generation will come forward to determine the fate of the nation as the 21st century approaches.

Let us think together for a moment as to what the final responsibilities of the '45 Generation are and what will be the responsibilities of the next generation as it takes advantage of the 5 coming years (1988-93). We should also calmly enumerate the things that have been accomplished and the tasks still needing completion.

We admit that the generational transition must take place naturally and without dramatization. Nevertheless, in view of the present situation of the Indonesian people, the transition to the next generation from the '45 Generation, born in the midst of revolution, has special features. It cannot be denied that the '45 Generation has a moral responsibility to close the pages of its history by leaving a good name, so that it will have a place of honor and will be remembered forever by succeeding generations.

We should together realize that it is easy to begin something well, but to end something well is not as easy as people think. If there are pearls of wisdom in the saying, "The first impression is a lasting one," then in the present situation these words should be changed to, "The last impression is a lasting one." Other pearls of wisdom are in the saying, "A tiger leaves his spots when he dies; an elephant leaves his ivory when he dies." In other words, their good and honorable name will be enjoyed by their grandchildren and the nation. The '45 Generation, which will pass the baton to the next one, needs to meditate on this. The idealism of an aging person usually becomes stronger and sharper.

A generational transition is like parents who call on their children to become useful leaders of their nation and state and who express sincere feelings and pray for their children. On the other hand, the children need the blessings of their parents and a sense of responsibility for protecting their parents as the parents become infirm and powerless. That is the nature of Indonesian culture, which is described as lofty and noble. No person or generation is perfect. The important thing, however, is for a person to be aware of his mistakes and to try honestly to change and to correct his mistakes so that his name and integrity can be restored.

Of the many positive things being bequeathed by the '45 Generation, several can be noted as assets to the assurance of continuity in national development in order that democratic life may flourish without risk. If, on the other hand, the next generation should nullify the conditions that have been created, a repetition of history cannot be avoided, and tensions will swamp the life of the nation. These conditions include the following:

1. Acceptance of Pancasila as sole principle. Since the birth of the Indonesian nation, the ideology of Pancasila and the UUD'45 [1945 Constitution] has been a source of national tension. People have often forgotten that to "maintain Pancasila and the UUD'45" is the oath of the TNI [Indonesian National Army] soldier. Whenever any sociopolitical force wants to change this doctrine, it soon comes face to face with the TNI. When such efforts are influenced especially by old ideologies from abroad, there is no course but to make Pancasila an openly declared ideology. It is not a dogma but is openly declared in the face of rapid international social developments. If it were not so, Pancasila would suffer the fate of communist ideology in the PRC and the Soviet Union.

2. Simplification of the party system into GOLKAR and PARPOL's [political parties]. After the liberal political experience of the 1950's and the abortive PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] coup, the issue at the end of the 1960's was simplification of the party system. Simplification guarantees a stable political life. Especially after the acceptance of Pancasila as sole principle, all PARPOL's and other social forces become open organizations. The obvious feature will be competition in the practice of Pancasila, in which the things that are forbidden (like capitalism, feudalism, etc.) have become, or will be, clear.

3. Religious toleration. Examples like the Iran-Iraq and Lebanese inter-Muslim wars, the inter-Christian war between the British and the Irish, and others, are cause for the Indonesian people to be thankful that such things do not happen in Indonesia. All religions accept the truth of one state and one nation.

4. The disappearance of the federalism illusion and ethnic and regional fanaticism. The federalism concept is dead and cannot possibly be peddled again in the nation's political life. Through a lengthy process, ethnic and regional fanaticism have disappeared.

5. Democratic institutions consistent with the UUD'45 have come into existence. Although democratic interaction between these institutions is not satisfactory yet, the fact that the institutions are in place represents an important asset to the assurance of a healthy democratic life.

6. The existence of a stratum of national cadres who are convinced that development can no longer be postponed. The presence of these cadres is a guarantee of the existence of a continuity of effort. The Indonesian people and their cooperative foreign colleagues have no reason to doubt there will be future leadership for the nation. Moreover, because of the new international climate created after more than 40 years in the grasp of the Cold War, the future world will be marked by peace and the permanence of humanitarian interests.

7. The ability of the Indonesian people to overcome domestic insurgencies by their own strength without the help of any external forces.

We hope the next generation will be able to manage these assets. The remaining 5 years should be used by the next generation to assimilate these assets and discuss them with members of the '45 Generation still on hand. All the conditions mentioned above were achieved through a lengthy and costly process, especially through the work of the New Order.

Government officials and intellectuals have given sufficient signal that the Indonesian people will face increasingly difficult challenges in the future. It is very logical that there should be a need for prospective leaders of integrity, character, and ability. Therefore, for the sake of the state and the nation, conditions of openness are needed in which there will be healthy competition among cadres, thus ultimately facilitating the nation's selection of its leaders.

Policies must be implemented down to the lowest echelons of government in order to alter the tension-filled atmosphere and to eliminate fear. On the other hand, the use of opportunities for openness should not be interpreted to mean that there may be demonstrations, derivative resolutions, accusations, etc. Such an interpretation would be NASAKOM [nationalism, religion, and communism] culture, which we rejected long ago. We must realize that 5 years is a short time, and that each eruption produces consequences that the next generation, not the '45 Generation, must bear.

A crisis will produce a strongman, or a leader who is unprepared and ignorant of politics. Overcoming a crisis takes time and special effort, and may in fact leave casualties. When a crisis is resolved, a start must be made again from zero, in spite of the fact that there are still very many other important issues, like the national debt.

Openness should be taken advantage of by creating study groups and seminars with the following objectives:

1. Discussion of conditions without being "vocal" or emotional, and especially without cursing conditions. 2. Development of a clear perception of the 21st century as

the year 1993 approaches. 3. A process for crystallization of thinking through lateral dialogue, so that by 1993 there will be no extension of a war of concepts.

The following are indicators in the political sector:

1. Efforts to create clean government, from the central government to the provinces. 2. A process of consolidation and self-sufficiency in GOLKAR and the PARPOL's as an effort to restore the authority of the DPR/MPR [Parliament/People's Consultative Assembly].

As for the economic sector, the following can be noted:

1. Over more than 40 years, the Indonesian people successfully undertook resolution of the issues of Western Indonesia because of the political and security problems there and because of the call of history. 2. There has been toughness in economic policy directed toward a healthy climate, but there are still external influences on the government to disrupt or delay thorough implementation of policies.

These are issues still unresolved by the '45 Generation:

1. Making Indonesia an economic and cultural entity. 2. Opening Eastern Indonesia. 3. Creating an interdependence among the main islands. 4. Putting in place and modernizing a maritime communications system as a foundation for developing land and air communications systems. 5. Expediting the process of modernization, industrialization, and acquisition of high technology in the framework of solving national strategic problems and establishing the nation's position at its crossroads location. Positive preparations for 1993 can be seen clearly in the things noted above, although challenges are increasingly serious.

Strategy Proposal for Air Force Development
42130048b Jakarta TEKNOLOGI & STRATEGI
MILITER in Indonesian Jan 89 pp 46-47

[Editorial: "Strategy for Organization of the Air Force as an Instrument of Defense and Security"]

[Text] To determine a strategy for the organization of the TNI-AU [Indonesian Air Force] in its function as an instrument of defense and security (HANKAM), we must look first at its principal duty. Law 20 of 1982 on state defense and security specifies that the duty of the TNI-AU is to uphold from the air the sovereignty of the state and to expand national potential into a national air defense and security force of every type. Thus, the general strategy for organization of the TNI-AU is to integrate forces in the aerial dimension in order to establish their presence for overcoming any type of threat at any time.

The reality of the TNI-AU presence as a HANKAM force is much determined by its destructive power, which is projected through its capabilities in strategic, tactical, and air defense operations. Superiority is maintained through these capabilities, which means supremacy in the air in the sense of "a complete aerial force." There are many factors, however, that must be considered in connection with strategy for TNI-AU organization, not only from the HANKAM aspect but from the welfare aspect as well.

Factors affecting strategy for the organization of the TNI-AU include threats, national economic capabilities, progress in science and technology (IPTEK), and Indonesia's geographic situation. These factors require various considerations, which are to be set one against another until they produce priorities that must be ordered. Thus, a strategy for organization of forces will be precise as to quantity and quality and will provide for expansion when needed.

In principle, threats do not come from the outside alone but from within the country as well. Threats from abroad are still marked by struggles among the interests of the superpowers and their allies in their efforts to establish influence. In the process, each power still restrains itself in order to avoid open war. We perceive that the most that will happen is limited war, so that the possibility of the invasion of Indonesia is extremely remote.

Infiltration and subversion are the things that are actively pursued. As these activities are continued, they will form links with security disruption movements (GPK) in the country, which consist of remnants of the G-30-S/PKI [30 September Movement/Indonesian Communist Party], PGRS/PARAKU [Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force/North Kalimantan People's Force], and extremist groups. With the formation of these links, we can expect the creation of opposition, disruptive movements, and armed rebellion, which will begin in regions of unrest.

In order to face the types of threats that may occur, strategy for organization of the TNI-AU should be formulated as follows:

- Although threats from abroad are perceived as not yet endangering national life, we must nevertheless remain alert to them. Therefore, we continue to require strength for developing operational readiness for rapid deployment in the form of air defense and strategic air operations. Their goal will be to block threats before they enter Indonesian territory, whether from the sea or the air;
- In order to face internal threats in the form of armed rebellion, forces should be readied with capability for conducting tactical air operations in support of KAM-DAGRI [internal security] operations;
- Studies of other factors are still needed in order to determine the size of forces required under strategic planning.

The recession swamping the world economy has great effect on the advanced nations themselves as well as on developing countries. Protectionist actions taken by the advanced countries for the sake of their industrial products add to the economic difficulties of the developing countries, including Indonesia. The promotion of nonoil exports, which show gratifying progress, cannot free Indonesia from problems as long as the world economic situation remains uncertain.

In view of the economic situation described above, the following strategy is proposed for the organization of the TNI-AU:

- Hold to ABRI's development policy of maintaining a force that is relatively small but of quality and high mobility, while at the same time not disallowing rapid expansion under emergency conditions;
- Determine the size of forces by projecting the intensity of threats, the direction from which they will come, and the strategic regions that must be defended;
- Make appropriate selection of SISTA (weapons systems) so that destructive power requirements can be fulfilled and systems can be oriented to multiple purposes, thus supporting the small-force posture;
- Integrate development with the utilization of national potential as a reserve TNI-AU force.

Signing of Cultural Cooperation Protocol With USSR

*BK2201145589 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
1200 GMT 21 Jan 89*

[Text] The representatives of the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports of the LPDR and the Soviet Ministry of Culture signed a protocol on cultural cooperation for 1989 in Vientiane this morning. Signing the protocol for the Lao side was Thongsing Thammavong, member of the party Central Committee and deputy minister for education, culture, and sports and for the Soviet side, (Sakaletin), Soviet deputy minister of culture who is

currently paying an official visit to Laos from yesterday to today. Attending the signing ceremony were a number of high-level cadres from the Lao side and Soviet Ambassador Yuriy Mikheyev. The protocol was aimed at extending the efficiency of the cooperation agreement signed between the two countries for the period from 1986 to 1990. The protocol also covers the exchange of cultural cadres. The Soviet side will send arts and acrobatic troupes to perform in Laos on important occasions and cultural specialists to help training Lao artists. At the same time, Lao students and cadres will receive short-term training and studies in the Soviet Union.

**Senate Hears Continuing Complaints of
Extrajudicial Killings**
42000075a Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 19 Dec 88 pp 1, 6

[Article by Johanna Son: "Rural Folk Still Mistrust Government"]

[Text] Lucena City—Arturo Escleto insists that the Armed Forces, in its current campaign in Quezon province, killed his sister and two male relatives in cold blood, because the soldiers mistook him for communist rebels.

Last Dec 5, he recounts, helicopter-borne troops descended on far-off Patnanungan Island (in the Polillo Island group off the Quezon mainland) and shot his sister Aleli, her husband and barangay captain Alfredo Seminiano and Sarmiento's brother Luis Esteves because "pinaratangan daw sila na mga NPA (New People's Army)."

Quoting witnesses, he says the military was not content with having shot Aleli despite her pleas for mercy. They slashed her wrists to make sure she would die, Escleto says.

As a result, he adds, "delikado na kaming mga kamag-anak." ["We relatives are at risk."]

The islands have been described by Southern Luzon Command chief Brig Gen Alejandro Galido as "practically" entirely controlled by communist rebels.

Col Santiago King, PC judge advocate general, is emphatic: "There is an ongoing operation in the province. These are victims of a legitimate operation," he says.

Earlier news reports quoted the military as saying all casualties were NPA rebels.

King also says that it has been "confirmed" that the killing involved the rebels. There is a "hidden something" here, he says, which would be disclosed when the operation report is declassified.

The incident is only one of the cases aired during a whole-day hearing on human rights conducted here Saturday by the Senate committees on justice and human rights, labor and national defense.

The hearing may not even solve cases like the Patnanungan incident. But it did not bring together in one place and at one time usually adversarial groups of people—witnesses, victims, the military hierarchy, and watchdog groups like the Task Force Detainees.

At the very least, the messages of victims seems disturbing.

Saying he just wants proper burial for his kin in Lucena, Escleto adds: "Sa katotohanan po, hindi na po kami interesado sa katarungan," ["To tell the truth, sir, we are not interested anymore in (seeking) justice,"] he says the Government is allegedly not anxious to go after military offenders.

He also expresses fear that his testimony before Tanada hearing might prompt AFP reprisals.

Mistrust for military officials persists.

King submitted to Sen Wigberto Tanada, justice and human rights committee chairman, a petition signed by more than 50 residents of Barangay Patnanungan, thanking the AFP for ending Seminiano's alleged forcible collection of NPA taxes.

"Buong puso po kaming nagpapasalamat sa pagkaratay ni Seminiano," ["We are deeply grateful for the killing of Seminiano,"] the Dec 16 petition reads. It describes the barangay captain as a character feared through the entire Polillo Island group, whose presence allowed residents no peace.

King adds that there was in fact an arrest warrant for murder issued against Seminiano as early as June 5, 1987.

But Escleto argues that Seminiano and his companions could not be NPAs because he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force and, along with his brother Luis, were "deep penetration agents" of the AFP in Southern Tagalog.

Gregorio Rosal, spokesman for the NPA's Melito Glor command in Southern Tagalog, has been quoted as denying the three were NPA leaders.

Citing that it is impossible to judge the incident based on the testimonies of both sides alone, the regional Commission on Human Rights says it will begin today a fact-finding mission to Patnanungan Island.

In another case, Manuel Caparos talks of having been forced to leave his home in Lopez, Quezon last July 27 by a vigilante-type armed group led by the "Solo brothers," constantly denounced by cause-oriented groups as being coddled by military officials.

Leticia Borromeo, a farmer of Catanauan town, says the Solo brothers, accompanied by military men, salvaged her husband on May 2, 1987.

Danilo Carandang, also a farmer, says he left Buenavista town after the Solo brothers killed his brother, his wife and his sister-in-law.

The TFD also points to the Solo brothers as one of the causes of the forced evacuation of 250 families from various barangay in Quezon.

Brig Gen Benjamin Dizon, regional commander 4 chief, says it was the first time he heard of the Solo brothers, but pledges to look into it immediately.

Regional human rights commissioner Narciso Montero, whose office was put up only in January this year, has had his hands full of requests for assistance.

He tells CHRONICLE that from April to November alone, the CHR in the region has resolved 87 out of 384 reported cases of killings, disappearances and other abuses by both the AFP and the NPA.

Among the biggest hindrances to investigation, he says, are witnesses' fear of testifying and the distance of Lucena City (CHR headquarters) from the far-flung and inaccessible barangay where the abuses are often reported.

Army Chief Reacts to Bataan Counterinsurgency Failure

42000075b Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 21 Dec 88 p 6

[Article by Manny Mogato]

[Text] Balanga, Bataan—Maj Gen Mariano P. Adalem, the Army chief, will deploy more troops in the Bataan peninsula because of the apparent failure of the anti-insurgency campaign there.

Adalem, who visited troops in the Central Luzon area to deliver the Christmas message of the Armed Forces, said the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept in Bataan would be reviewed and modified after its initial operations failed to get rebels and their sympathizers to the government fold.

"This is the first time our SOT operations seemed to be failing," Adalem said. "This is the first time that we encountered a situation like this."

Adalem explained that people in the communist-influenced barangay in Abucay, Samal and Orani towns remained passive to the SOT operations.

"Pag pinapunta mo sa dialog, okaynaman sila, pero pag kinakausap mo na, ayaw nang magsalita," ["When you go to a 'dialogue' (mass meeting with the townspeople), they attend the meeting, but they don't speak up,"] he observed.

He also said many of his SOT teams who were immersing themselves in the barangay to find out problems in the area usually ends up locked in a debate with the people. "Nakikipagdiskurso pa sila, lumalaban issue for issue sa plataporma," ["They give speeches from the platform, arguing issue after issue,"] he added citing reports from his field commanders who also found the area very hostile, and the people "very passive."

Adalem himself found this out when he tried to open an open forum with a group of barangay leaders in Barangay Poblacion in Abucay town.

No one in the group was willing to talk or dialog or open up a discussion. Some local officials were also staring and listening blankly to Adalem who was stressing the military's role in keeping peace and order in the town.

Col Liberato Manuel, commander of the 702nd Infantry Brigade operating in the Bataan and Zambales peninsula, said 45.81 per cent of Bataan's 227 villages were either communist-influenced or infiltrated.

Political and united front build up in the province were very visible and captured documents indicated that some elected officials were members of the National Democratic Front (NDF) or party members of the underground communist movement.

Manuel said the communist had full control of some remote villages that a provisional government already existed. He said it would be very hard for them to dismantle the rebel political and economic structure in the province without enough force. The NPA strength in the province was estimated at 566 with more than 220 high powered firearms, the biggest guerrilla force in the seven-province central Luzon commission of the CPP.

Col Rene Dado, the Army's operations officer, however, had another opinion. He believed the SOT teams that were fielded in the area were not prepared enough to face a different situation.

"Masyado sigurong hilaw ang SOT, dapat ay training pa at konting pagbabago sa istilo dahil nagagaspas din ito. Parang plaka." [The SOT (teams) are certainly very inexperienced. They need training and some improvement in techniques because they sound like a worn-out record."]

Daily Analyzes Poll on NPA Popularity

42000083 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 9 Jan 89 p 4

["Social Climate" column by Mahar Mangahas: "How People View the NPA"]

[Text] Admitting to using firecrackers and to being a member of the NPA, though both are illegal activities, are very different things. The more delicate a matter being surveyed, the more critical is the survey question wording.

At Social Weather Stations, our monitoring of people's views on the NPA has included the following four agree-disagree (sang-ayon/di-sang-ayon) test statements: (a) Ang samahan o organisasyon ng NPA ay laganap sa probinsiya/lungsod na ito. (b) Ang suporta ng mga mamamayan sa mga komunistang rebelde ay lumalakas. (c) Karamihan ng mga tao sa probinsiya/lungsod na ito

ay walang simpatiya sa NPA. (d) Karamihan ng mga ginagawa ng NPA ay hindi makatarungan. For short, let us call these indicators of (a) NPA presente, (b) trend in NPA support, (c) non-sympathy for the NPA, and (d) unjust acts of the NPA.

For the Philippines as a whole, the agree-disagree percentage scores on these survey items, as found in the SWS survey data bank, are seen in the table below:

Table

Date	NPA Presence	Trend in NPA Support	Non-Sympathy for NPA	Unjust NPA Acts
July 1985	28-26		28-23	20-28
May 1986	38-31		46-27	31-31
March 1987	39-42	17-63	47-25	47-23
October 1987	40-34	20-39	42-18	42-17
September 1988	35-44	22-53	40-30	37-26

These are all the surveys in which the questions have been used. Question (b) was started only in March 1987. The wording was identical for all surveys. The reference population was that of voting-age adults in all cases, with a sample size of 2,000 in the first two rounds and 1,200 thereafter (with sampling error margins of 2.2 points and 2.9 points respectively).

The first survey was that of the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference and the next three were part of the earlier SWS-Ateneo joint project. The September 1988 survey was a sole SWS responsibility, patronized, but not commissioned, by a number of government agencies, private businesses, members of the diplomatic corps and other persons interested in our pre-publication briefings. We do not hold press conferences.

All our survey findings are for eventual public use. In fact, all of the findings on the NPA cited above have been published before, except for the September 1988 results.

Let me offer a personal interpretation of the survey findings. First of all, back in 1985, only about half were willing to give a definite answer to a survey question on the NPA. So many said they weren't sure, or didn't answer, and so the sum of agree's and disagree's were far less than 100. It was in 1986 that two-thirds or more began to give a definite reply.

Also note that, to be favorable to the government and unfavorable to the NPA, survey replies should be negative regarding NPA presence and trend in NPA support; but affirmative regarding non-sympathy to the NPA and unjust NPA acts.

I would not regard the 10-point rise, from 28 to 38 per cent between 1985 and 1986, in those seeing widespread NPA presence, as a real increase. There were many people who felt freer to admit such a thing in 1986 compared to 1985. (This is corroborated by separate survey data on freedom of speech which can be taken up another time.) Over 1986-87, those who perceived NPA presence were static between 38 to 40 points. Then in 1988 they fell, slightly but noticeably, to 35 points, while those who did not see such a presence rose to 44 points, the highest level so far achieved.

Regarding the trend in the support for the NPA, the dominant opinion is that it is not growing. This dominance was very great in March 1987, but it fell in October 1987, and recovered, partially, in late 1988. Regarding non-sympathy for the NPA and the perception that most NPA acts are unjust, the agree-minus-disagree margins show very unfavorable (to the government) conditions in 1985, a moderate gain in 1986, and a very substantial further gain in 1987; 1988, however, was a setback for the government (though not all the way back to 1986).

For an overall assessment, recall the government performance ratings on "weakening the rebel movements" which I cited last week: a September 1988 margin of public satisfaction of only +1, compared to an October 1987 margin of +12.

So the government is moving someplace, but all is not upward and onward; there also are setbacks. There are as yet no laurels worth resting on. When 35 per cent see a widespread NPA, 22 per cent see popular support for the NPA as growing, 30 per cent think that most people sympathize with the NPA, and 26 per cent think that most NPA acts are just, the government cannot afford to relax. Why start the new year by patting itself on the back, when 1988 was not as good a year as 1987?

Daily Analyzes Slow Pace of Privatization
42000080a Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE
in English 2 Jan 89 p 13

[Special Report by Leticia M. Subang: "The Slow Pace of Privatization"]

[Text] When the Aquino administration assumed power more than two years ago, privatization became more than an economic platform. The expansion of the public sector had been closely associated with "cronyism," an economic set-up that evolved during martial law years where economic privileges were extended to a favored few in return for political patronage.

Government corporations, controlled by those close to power, created subsidiaries, which in turn created more subsidiaries. This rapid growth of state-owned enterprises had contributed to the country's huge foreign debts and acute fiscal and balance of payments problems.

In addition, many private corporations, particularly the highly leveraged ones, went bankrupt as the economic crisis plagued the Philippine economy during the early 80s. State-owned banks like the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), which were often used as conduits for such political patronage, slowly found themselves raddled with non-performing assets. By default, the government became the owner of a number of unwanted private companies.

To rehabilitate the PNB and DBP, a total of 399 accounts that had already defaulted were transferred to the national government in June 1986. Then by December, Proclamation 50, which created the Committee on Privatization (COP) and the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and spelled out the government's privatization policy, was signed. Hopes ran high that finally government was serious in leaving business to the private sector.

The country's privatization program has followed two distinct though not entirely separate tracks. One involves the bidding out of companies or assets foreclosed or about to be foreclosed by the DBP and the PNB. This is not privatization in the real sense, but re-privatizing what once belonged to the private sector.

The other, wherein the real essence of the government's privatization program lies, is the divestment, either partially or in full, from various corporations owned and controlled by the government.

Observers note that the implementation of the program with respect to the government corporations is going at a snail's pace.

Finance Secretary Vicente Jayme, who is also chairman of the COP, in his 1987 year-end report to the President said that 86 of the 121 government corporations to be disposed of are slated for "immediate privatization" which "would be offered for sale during 1988." Of the 86 corporations, 59 already had privatization plans approved by the COP.

Now the list has been pared down to 115 and may even go lower if the COP grants the request of some agencies such as the NDC to delist more companies.

Properties Sold

After two years, however, only ten of the 115 government owned and controlled corporations have been fully sold. Six of the ten companies were subsidiaries of the National Development Co. (NDC), the investment arm of the Department of Trade and Industry. These were Asia Industries Inc. and Beta Electric Corp. (for a total of P123 million), National Marine Corp. (for P168 million), Usipil Inc. (for P35.5 million), Mindanao Textile Corp. (for P19.1 million), and Tacoma Bay

Shipping Co. (for P10 million) and the 100-hectare prime property of Marina Property Corporation (for P1,777.78 million). In addition NDC has disposed of some assets, mostly vessels.

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) had, so far, sold two of its companies: the Commercial Bank of Manila (for P510 million) and Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines, which owns Hyatt Regency (for P325 million). The Philippine National Bank has sold its shares, which represent 85 per cent of Pilipinas Bank, for P405 million to Prudential Bank.

Seven other government companies have partially been sold, either through sale of stocks or assets. These are the International Corporate Bank, National Shipping Corporation of the Philippines, National Stevedoring and Lighterage Corp., Negros Occidental Copperfield Mines, Inc. and The Energy Corp., all subsidiaries of NDC. The Social Security System had also sold part of the Union Bank of the Philippines to the Aboitiz group and the Presidential Management Staff had been disposing of the assets of Woodwaste Utilization and Development Corp.

Recently, the Home Insurance Guaranty Corp. conducted a bidding of Maunlad Savings and Loan Association. The Rizal-based savings bank is likely to be awarded to the group led by real estate developer Antonio Turrallba, who submitted the highest bid of P14.1 million.

Finance Undersecretary Diosdado Macapagal, Jr., who also heads the COP technical committee, said that revenues from the sale of government-owned and controlled corporations estimated to have reached about P3.8 billion.

That the disposition of the government-owned corporations had been slow had been the source of irritation, specially to those who had expressed interest in those companies.

A banker who had packaged a number of deals involving assets sold by the APT said that a number of investors have expressed interest in several government corporations, particularly, the Philippine Airlines, National Steel Corp., The Manila Hotel and Philippine Plaza Hotel.

Macapagal, who is relatively new on his job, appears to be willing to give executives of the corporations concerned the benefit of the doubt that they are fully convinced of the government's privatization program. "It isn't that they don't want to sell. It's just a question of timing," Macapagal said.

Edgardo del Fonso, Macapagal's predecessor and who was among those who designed the program right from the start, is less forgiving in his assessment. "Privatization, as an abstraction, ranks up there with Grd,

motherhood and country. Everybody is for it, except when it applies to them. That the program has not achieved significant results—or at least is perceived as such—is a measure of the alacrity with which privatization is being pursued," he said.

Abdicating Responsibility

In short, COP had abdicated its monitoring and supervising responsibility over the program considering that the targets were clearly defined right when they started.

If government executives are taking their time in disposing of corporations slated for privatization, it is mainly because the COP, the policy making body, has failed to flex its muscles and compel them to hurry up.

Proclamation 50, which spelled out the government's privatization policy, empowers the COP to take over a corporation if needed to hasten the program implementation.

Section 5(6) of the proclamation specifically provides the COP the privilege "to exercise on behalf of the National Government rights of ownership with respect to such assets, including the right to vote, whether directly or through duly authorized nominees, shares of stocks held in the name of the national government, and which have not been transferred to the (Asset Privatization) Trust."

The COP is composed of the secretaries of finance (as chairman), budget and management, trade and industry, justice and the director general of the National Economic and Development Board. The privatization program, as reflected by the lifespan of both the COP and APT, is supposed to be completed within five years.

Aside from the APT, ten other agencies were authorized by the government to sell, namely the: Department of Agriculture (with six companies to sell), Department of Tourism (with one hotel), Department of Transport and Communications (with four companies), Government Service Insurance System (with five companies), Home Insurance and Guaranty Corp. (with one savings bank), National Development Co. (with 38 companies), Philippine National Bank (with 11 companies), Philippine National Oil Co. (with seven companies), Presidential Management Staff (with 26 companies) and Social Security System (with three companies).

The existing structure has not been spared from criticism. APT officials had, at some point, complained of the "defect in the internal operation of the APT and COP." All decision-making is done by the COP, which is composed of cabinet members with whom the privatization program is just one of many concerns. "They don't have the luxury to reflect on issues," Del Fonso noted.

Del Fonso, however, defended the set-up he helped design, comparing the COP-APT structure to the relationship between the company management and its board of directors. "APT tends to bend over backwards for the buyers in their desire to dispose of the assets quickly," he noted. As APT officials would often argue on the criticisms that theirs is a bargain basement sale: A bird in hand is better than two in the bush.

The framers of the government's privatization program initially thought of giving the APT the sole responsibility of selling the assets. But as Del Fonso noted, the APT, in disposing the PNB and DBP-acquired assets, was bound to encounter difficult problems. It was a question of how much APT could digest without taxing the organization, Del Fonso said.

"Besides, NDC, PNOC, the Department of Agriculture were already taking steps to privatize their corporations," he added. "They have the mechanism to implement their own privatization program. And at that time, they were showing willingness to do it," he said explaining why 11 agencies were involved in the program.

Del Fonso recalled that the "disposition entities," as these agencies were called, were asked to submit complete privatization plans for these companies within 60 days.

"In theory, it could have been an orderly and systematic program, without creating any significant bottlenecks," he said.

At the end of the 60 days, however, not all were able to comply.

And that would have been the best time for the COP to crack its whip and force the people concerned to follow.

And for the program to succeed, the need to reconstitute the COP so that the people running it would have the privatization program as their principal responsibility is getting more apparent.

For privatization is a departure from the status quo and, as such, is bound to be confrontational.

When the program was started in late 1986, the executives running the corporations concerned were not yet settled on their jobs, and there was a high level of enthusiasm over the program. But people had slowly become familiar with the status quo they had intended to confront at the start.

"Indeed, the time to mount an effective program may have passed; by now corporate managers who have gotten used to the power and prerequisites that go with the job may not so willingly give them up," Del Fonso

said. "By implication, the government has to put a little more mustard to the program, take a more directive and assertive role if privatization is to achieve a measure of success."

Leopoldo de Guzman, an APT executive trustee who resigned a few months back, once noted: "The slow pace in the privatization of (government owned and controlled corporations) is a product of both dilly-dallying by the executives of the state-owned corporations to be privatized and the inability of the COP to implement definite privatization programs."

That most members of the COP had a direct hand in the management of some corporations in the privatization list does not appear to have helped hasten the program. Instead, this has been perceived as one of the obstacles. Take Trade and Industry Secretary Concepcion, a member of the COP, who sits on the board of a number of government-owned companies that are to be privatized, as an example.

Based on a report issued by the Commission on Audit late last year, Concepcion has, among government officials, the most number of board seats—19 in all as of December 1987—which include NDC and PNOC, both designated by the government as disposition entities.

Furthermore, the 19 seats reported by COA still do not include companies it does not regularly audit such as Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp., National Steel Corp. and Philippine Associated Smelter and Refining Corp., all NDC subsidiaries which are also scheduled for privatization. Being on the board of these companies, Concepcion could practically nag the companies' management to speed up the privatization program.

A banker who had been quite active in packaging deals involving APT assets noted that one can expect resistance from government officials to immediately privatize these companies. "It is our system of patronage. They could place their people in these corporations as a form of reward," he said. And those running these corporations are bound to resist as they would not want to lose their jobs, another banker added.

Flip-Flopping Over Petron

In 1987, for example, the government, acceding to the request of the PNOC management headed by Manuel Estrella, deferred the privatization of its leading subsidiary, Petron Corp. Senator Vicente Paterno, who headed PNOC before Estrella, was bent on privatizing Petron.

Early last year, Estrella announced that PNOC will be retaining most of its subsidiaries except for seven companies, namely: PNOC Marine Corp., PNOC Coal Corp., Bislig Coal Corp., Malangas Coal Corp., Filoil Refinery Corp., Filoil Industrial Estates, Inc., and

PNOC Energy Supply Base. Estrella had previously promised in a much publicized announcement that the sale of the seven companies should be completed by the third quarter of 1988.

The privatization of Petron had been "shelved permanently," a ranking official of PNOC said. The government still has to make an official pronouncement on the Petron case which is now with the Office of the President.

Observers note that government's reluctance to privatize Petron is difficult to comprehend as it is in an industry that is not even nationalized and in which the private sector has proven itself.

In the final analysis, the government, by dilly-dallying in the Petron case, may have lost the chance to make a strong political statement that it is indeed serious in its privatization program.

It appears that PNOC is simply stonewalling, seeking refuge behind issues they themselves could resolve. One issue, which PNOC officials have tossed back to COP, was the question of who would eventually embark on coal exploration in the country once they sell the three coal subsidiaries, which had an aggregate book value of close to P2 billion as of December 1987.

PNOC also expressed concern on the point raised by interisland shipowners who asked that the privatization of PNOC Marine, which operates a shipyard in Batangas, be deferred. The interisland shipowners pointed out that ship repair costs are bound to increase if the said shipyard would go to foreign buyers, citing their experience with a Cebu shipyard which was recently taken over by a Singaporean firm.

And with respect to the vast real estate properties now with Filoil, PNOC had raised the question on whether they should be instrumental in the escalation of real estate prices in Cavite, which is very likely once they put these properties on the auction block.

Furthermore, PNOC is thinking of going into joint ventures in developing its coal mines, Estrella added. "We have been receiving offers from interested parties," he said. Estrella added that they have conducted three public biddings for its coal mines but nobody came. "As far as we are concerned, the ball is with COP now," a PNOC official said.

The delay is already affecting the interest of would-be investors. A PNOC official said several companies, mostly construction firms, have expressed interest in the coal mines. But with PNOC's dilly-dallying plus the upsurge in the construction and real estate industry, they slowly lost interest, he added.

A banker also noted that not so many clients are taking a serious look at the PNOC subsidiaries. "Businessmen have to allocate their time. They are not inclined to go on a wild goose chase," he noted.

The same issues are bugging GSIS's privatization efforts particularly for Manila Hotel and Philippine Airlines. "We have not decided how much we are willing to give up," GSIS vice president and treasurer Lucretia L. Wilson said on the progress on Manila Hotel. "It is a national landmark. Will we allow it to be owned by foreigners?" she added.

PAL president Dante Santos assured that the direction being taken by PAL is towards privatization, "its just a question of how much."

Santos added that in the process of privatizing PAL, the "strategic nature of the company and national interests" should be taken into consideration.

Personally, Santos said, he would like to see PAL under private control. It would be best to have control under Filipino hands with GSIS retaining minority share and some going to PAL employees themselves, Santos added.

The question of foreign ownership often crops up as more and more companies are slated for privatization.

"I don't understand why it should come up at all," Del Fonso commented. The government's privatization program will not alter the country's investment laws. In fact, it is governed by those laws. "If you want to restrict foreign ownership, then change the investment laws," he added.

With NDC, the investment arm of the Department of Trade and Industry, the privatization efforts tend to be selective. There are those that they don't want to sell and it is not for lack of buyers, one source who had been working closely with COP noted. He cited the case of National Steel Corp., whose privatization plan has been approved by the COP more than a year ago.

The NDC management had slated NSC for privatization "in the near term" after the completion of an integrated mill study that they are conducting.

So far, of the 38 NDC subsidiaries slated for privatization, seven had been fully sold, four had been partially sold and another nine were for immediate bidding. Seven other companies, mostly the bigger ones, are undergoing financial restructuring or rehabilitation. They are Semirara Coal Corp., Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp., Philippine Pyrite Corp., NDC-Guthrie Phils., Inc., NDC-Guthrie Estates, Inc., Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining Corp., and National Chemical Carriers, Inc.

Meanwhile, NDC has also committed itself to divest "in the near term" Luzon Integrated Service, Inc., whose balance sheet is being cleaned up in preparation for the public bidding, and the International Corporate Bank, where guidelines from NDC board on the timing and extent of divestment for the remaining 60 per cent shareholding will have to be secured first.

Even President Aquino herself, at some point, expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the program's implementation. Exactly a year ago, in a speech before businessmen, she ordered that the government-owned and controlled corporations be turned over to APT to sell. Right after the presidential pronouncement, APT received many inquiries particularly for the big ticket items.

At that time, only 10 government corporations, almost all of which were troubled once with minimal or even negative book values, had been turned over to APT. Fifteen other corporations—again, most of them losing and a number with no commercial operations yet—had been transferred to APT from the Presidential Management Staff early this month. This alone manifests the need for firm action at the very top if the government's much-touted privatization program is to succeed.

Centralization

While many, including government executives involved in the privatization effort, recognize the need to centralize the activities under one agency, it is something difficult to achieve considering that most of the agencies involved are governed by their own charters and have their own agenda to meet.

The GSIS, for example, wants to realize between eight to 10 per cent return from such assets. "We don't want to sell at garage sale prices, Wilson said noting that the funds invested in these assets are actually trust funds of its members.

GSIS is an investing institution, Santos added. "When GSIS invests in an enterprise, it does not mean that we want to compete with the private sector," he said comparing GSIS with the private insurance companies.

GSIS officials had been emphatic on the point that the funds invested in these corporations are not the government's but of their members who are government employees. "We are actually proceeding according to schedule," one GSIS official noted, adding that they have even sold assets which many did not think are marketable such as the Jasmin Hotel in Sta. Mesa (for P18.1 million) and Enrico Hotel (for P35.5 million).

With the Philippine Airlines, a valuation study funded by the Asian Development Bank and conducted by privatization experts from London are still ongoing. The ADB team had already submitted an interim report which will be submitted to a task force composed of representatives from the Office of the President, Office

of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Transportation and Communications, GSIS, and PAL. The second phase, which will include the technical aspect of selling the airlines, should be completed by February next year.

With respect to hotels owned by GSIS, the program of action was to sell them one after the other—with Hyatt first, then Philippine Plaza, followed by The Manila Hotel. Hyatt has been sold. GSIS is still untangling what appears to be a convoluted relationship with another government agency, the Cultural Center of the Philippines. The Philippine Plaza, which is operating as a division of CCP, was originally mortgaged to GSIS for

close to P1 billion. When CCP could not pay the amortizations, it used the hotel itself to pay back the loan sometime in 1981. GSIS, in turn, leased it back to CCP with a purchase option, an agreement that had to be terminated before the hotel could be sold, Wilson said.

Recently, GSIS chief Feliciano Belmonte announced that Philippine Plaza will be sold by the first quarter this year. Only then will they start planning for the disposal of The Manila Hotel.

"Belmonte has a very novel plan for (Manila Hotel)," GSIS spokesman Raul Gonzales said without elaborating.

Well, everybody is waiting for it.

Cabinet Approves Plans To Buy Israeli Rockets
BK0102013989 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
1 Feb 89 p 1

[Text] The Cabinet yesterday approved an Air Force request to buy 40 Python-3 rockets from Israel for US\$9.6 million (250 million baht).

Cabinet sources said the Air Force would pay for the weapons in three years—\$1.4 million this year, \$4 million in 1990 and \$4.2 million in 1991.

Scholars Comment on Hun Sen Visit
BK2401104389 Bangkok MATICHON in Thai
19 Jan 89 p 6

[Text] If Prime Minister Hun Sen of the Heng Samrin Khmer faction really visits Thailand and meets with Thai government leaders, including General Chatchai Chunhawan himself, this would be another step in Thailand's shift in foreign policy, which has come in rapid steps. Gen Chatchai stated after visiting Laos a few weeks ago that he was ready to meet Hun Sen.

No one thought it would come about this fast. Thailand, during the previous government terms, was firm in not meeting or holding talks with the Heng Samrin government as that would mean a recognition of that government, considered by the government of General Prem Tinsulanon as a puppet government installed by Vietnam. Thailand and its ASEAN allies stood firm in their struggle at the United Nations to prevent the General Assembly from giving recognition to the Khmer puppet regime.

The campaign waged by Thailand and its ASEAN allies since 1979 has been successful. The CGDK received more support from the world community than the Hun Sen government of the Heng Samrin group.

Suddenly there was a report saying that Hun Sen will visit Thailand and will hold talks with high-level government officials, possibly the prime minister himself.

This is why we should listen to views of scholars in foreign affairs concerning the forthcoming visit by Hun Sen and his meeting with the Thai government officials.

There Should Be Nothing Wrong

Surachai Sirikrai of Thammasat University's Faculty of Political Science says: "This is General Chatchai's initiative aimed at a fast resolution of the Cambodian problem through direct negotiations." "Meanwhile, Hun Sen must also expect recognition for his faction sooner. This involves mutual benefit and nothing bad for them. Thailand will not recognize him as a government leader, but as leader of a Khmer faction."

"I don't think the Foreign Ministry will recognize him as leader of Cambodia," he said, adding: "But it will have to accept him more or less. Direct talks should be useful. We might adopt a more flexible attitude. Air Chief Marshal Sitthi's meeting with Nguyen Co Thach resulted in Vietnam becoming less suspicious and this has facilitated the process for settlement of Cambodia."

This contact therefore "must be based on mutual interests which will help speed up the process of negotiations," the scholar from Tha Phrachan concluded.

Not Following a Conservative Approach

Hun Sen's visit "might shock several people," Thanasarit Satawethin, political science lecturer from Ramkhamhaeng University, opined.

"This is another step among many steps taken, but this one is a big jump, practically speaking. It must be a common policy adopted by the Foreign Ministry, the government and the military. It seems that everyone is aiming at quickly ending the Cambodian problem and thinks that it is necessary to implement the policy of changing the battlefield into a marketplace."

Thanasarit continued: "This step will make ASEAN friends happy. They probably hoped we would do this a long time ago. But our previous government held diplomacy as a formality. Whereas, under the present situation, international politics do not follow conservative practice anymore, but are adjusted to flexibility and practical approaches aimed at achieving results."

"Hun Sen is probably coming as leader of a Khmer faction," the scholar from Hua Mak comments.

We Have Already Talked to Him

"I learned of his coming visit from sources at Government House and the military," said Pratyathawi Tawethikun, deputy director general of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department.

"The Foreign Ministry views that, if Hun Sen comes, the move is considered part of the peace process. We have already had dialogue with leaders of the three other Khmer factions. There should be nothing wrong if we talk with another one."

"We will treat him as having a part of the peace process," Pratyathawi said, "not as representing Cambodia. At the first informal meeting of the four Khmer factions in Indonesia, our delegation already had talks with his delegation."

If Hun Sen comes "this can be considered a followup in a series of efforts to speed the peace process. Anyway, I don't think he will come this weekend because Air Chief Marshal Sitthi will still be absent attending a meeting in

Jakarta. It should rather be next week," continued Pratyathawi or Than Rong [Deputy] for reporters covering news at the Foreign Ministry.

I Don't Believe It Is True

Concerning a report about Hun Sen's coming visit to Thailand, "I don't believe it," said Khian Thirawit, political science lecturer at Chulalongkorn University.

"Because I don't think the Thai Government would be that simpleminded. I think that, concerning whatever is going on in Cambodia, Thailand's stand is that of fighting for what is right and serves national interests. Success is at hand."

"If Hun Sen comes to Thailand," Khian Thirawit comments, "it means that Thailand agreed to back down first, instead of waiting for those responsible for all the troubles to admit it, and they are Vietnam and Hun Sen, not Thailand or ASEAN."

"The Soviet Union and Vietnam refused to welcome Prince Sihanouk, who represents the legitimate government of Cambodia, internationally accepted at the United Nations. Meanwhile, the side which has been upholding the right principle is now reversing its stand, moving toward recognizing the puppet regime. This is damaging to the country in terms of principle as well as interests, and confusing to other countries which support Thailand and ASEAN, no matter whether we give this leader an official or a private welcome," the wellknown scholar from Samyan asserted, adding emphatically that "I don't believe it's true."

Delegates Block Laos-SRV Bid for Mekong Projects in PRK

BK0102011589 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
1 Feb 89 p 2

[Text] Thailand yesterday blocked attempts by Vietnam and Laos to have the Interim Mekong Committee adopt development projects in Kampuchea, informed sources said.

The sources told *THE NATION* the committee members spent more than three hours discussing the feasibility of the proposed projects.

A Vietnamese delegate added the projects to the agenda of the committee's meeting, citing what he claimed to be a bright prospect of a peace settlement in Kampuchea.

He said the situation should permit the Interim Mekong Committee to resume its development projects in Kampuchea after a 10-year-old stall.

Laotian delegates voiced support for Vietnam's proposal and prompted the committee's chairman to initiate a closed session with selective delegates, comprising senior delegates from Thailand, Vietnam and Laos, as well as a few secretariat officials, to discuss the issue.

According to the sources, the Thai delegates insisted that the present situation in Kampuchea still does not guarantee safety for implementation of such projects because the rural areas of the country is still dominated by guerrilla activities.

The Thai delegates also argued that the vacant seat of Kampuchea in the Interim Mekong Committee since the Vietnamese invasion in 1978, poses a legal controversy.

The Thais proposed that any development projects in Kampuchea should be implemented after peace is achieved in that country.

The meeting ended without any solution on the issue, said the sources.

A Mekong Basin Project official said that prior to 1978 the committee had launched two large irrigation dams in Tonle Sap and a Mekong's tributary at Prek Thnot. The uncompleted dams were abandoned during the past 10 years.

The official said that other major projects for Kampuchea are three large dams on the Mekong at Khone Falls, Stung Treng and Sambor in Kratie province.

Praphat Premmani, chairman of the committee for 1989, refused to give details of yesterday's meeting.

He said the meeting will continue today to approve papers discussed. The papers, dealing with evaluation of projects implemented and new projects, will be presented to the annual meeting of the committee on May 22-25 in Khon Kaen.

Editorial Views Current Moves To Resolve Cambodian Issue

BK0102011989 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
1 Feb 89 p 8

[Editorial: "Nobody Wants To Miss the Boat to Peace in Kampuchea"]

[Excerpts] Developments in the international efforts to resolve the Kampuchean problem are unfolding so rapidly these days that no party concerned with this 10-year-old conflict can afford to watch idly from the sidelines.

The leaders of the three Khmer resistance factions which form the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) agreed on Monday night, at a meeting with Prime Minister Gen Chatchai Chunhawan, that they will attend the second round of informal talks on Kampuchea in Jakarta, or JIM II. [passage omitted]

With or without Prince Sihanouk at JIM II, the international efforts to resolve the Kampuchean conflict will continue and intensify. If he still entertains the illusion that he is the indispensable person for a political settlement in Kampuchea, Prince Sihanouk will miss the boat to a meaningful role in the peace process.

Thach and Hun Sen, premier of the pro-Hanoi Khmer regime in Phnom Penh, will attend JIM II. But since Hanoi has virtually committed itself to a complete military withdrawal from Kampuchea by September, Thach will have not much else to say. The spotlight this time will be on Hun Sen, who will be under growing international pressure to show his worth as a "legitimate" contender for power in post-settlement Kampuchea.

So far Hun Sen has mostly toed Hanoi's line of linking the complete Vietnamese withdrawal to the cessation of external aid to the Khmer resistance forces of the CGDK and refusing to dismantle the government structure of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).

Hun Sen's PRK claims to have—with the help of Vietnamese troops and advisers—effective control of most of Kampuchea and its estimated population of seven million. But the UN recognizes the CGDK as the only legitimate Khmer government.

After 10 years, it is far too late for leaders of the two Khmer sides to argue who has a better claim to legitimacy over Kampuchea. The crux of the Kampuchean issue now is how to stop the killing and suffering in Kampuchea and work out a compromise to accommodate the conflicting claims of the two sides so that peace will return to the war-torn country as soon as possible.

CGDK leaders and Hun Sen have made the right decision to attend JIM II. We hope they will also have the courage to explore new ideas and negotiate in good faith. They should not have much difficulty agreeing on what is good for Kampuchea and its seven million people. After all, they are all claiming to represent the interests of the same Kampuchean nation.

POLITICAL

National Assembly Deputies Interviewed
42090128b Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 9 Dec 88 pp 1, 3

[Interview with National Assembly Deputies before their departure to attend the fourth session of the National Assembly by correspondent Hai Nam: "Meeting With National Assembly Deputies Prior to Fourth Session;" date and place of interview not given; first paragraph is SAIGON GIAI PHONG introduction]

[Text] Mrs. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Phuong, Vice Chairman of the National Assembly; Mr. Ly Chanh Trung, Acting Chief of Ho Chi Minh City National Assembly Delegation; Mr. Ca Le Thuan, Municipal National Assembly Deputy; Mr. Nguyen Van Thanh, Long An Province National Assembly Deputy and Vice Chairman of the Long An Province Fatherland Front Committee; and Dr. Tran Minh Phung, Tien Giang Province National Assembly Deputy and Director of the Tien Giang General Hospital exchanged opinions with a SAIGON GIAI PHONG correspondent before departing to attend the fourth session of the National Assembly.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, what are the most pressing problems presented by the voters before the coming session of the National Assembly?

[Ly Chanh Trung] The most pressing problem to the people and to the municipal National Assembly delegation is the increasingly more serious economic situation. The reason is that the Resolution of the Sixth Party Congress has not been thoroughly implemented. I think that a number of individuals in the party and the state do not fully endorse Resolution 6. They do not want or lack the ability to implement the Party's resolution.

[Correspondent] The voters are more specific. For example, we hear a great many producers complaining of erroneous tax policies.

[Nguyen Van Thanh] Yes, that is so. The opinions held by the Long An electorate are in agreement with those held by the voters of Ho Chi Minh City which they follow through the press. If collections are made precisely in accordance with the present tax categories, the production development course of economic elements would be greatly and adversely affected. Officials in the Provincial Finance Service also confirm that if taxation is conducted precisely as stipulated, basic production units will find it impossible to survive. A producer who dislikes cheating must do so to exist, creating negativism and disrupting discipline.

[Ly Chanh Trung] The law supplementing industrial trade taxes that was issued in November 1987 is totally misunderstood by the National Assembly. During the December 1987 session, no report was made by the

National Assembly although it was an extremely important law. At that session, the National Assembly passed a law on export-import duties. The Municipal Delegation did not agree on the law but was in the minority. Now, reality has shown that both of these kinds of taxes are irrational.

[Dr. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Phuong] At that time, I was the only one in the National Assembly Presidium who did not vote for export-import duties.

[Ca Le Thuan] I believe the problems of science, culture and education are also extremely worthy of concern. The objective deserving most attention is the youth because without correct social policy, the youth problem will become extremely worrisome.

[Dr. Tran Minh Phung] It appears to me that the National Assembly Presidium is passive and unable to make a self-determination on the program of the National Assembly session.

[Correspondent] The land situation in the provinces of Nam Bo is also of extreme concern to the voters. Would you give us your opinions?

[Dr. Ngoc Phuong] The recent struggle by the farmers indicates that a number of errors exist in the previous agricultural transformation policy. Resolution 10 of the Political Bureau on agriculture aroused a positive psychology among the farmers. In my opinion however, resolution of the land problem at the present time must be truly steady and delicate, motivating a spirit of mutual aid and protection among the farmers with no need for the use of administrative methods. When the hearts of the people are persuaded, the problem will be resolved.

[Nguyen Van Thanh] Previously, the Party Central Committee directed completion of cooperativization by 1985 and many locations were forced into achieving the time norm. Long An Province reported the completion of cooperativization on 30 April 1985. The mistake was caused by this program of the Central Committee and not due only to the local area. Naturally, in achievement there are also cases of erroneous activity that must now be corrected. Moreover, there were mistakes in the program of "land equality and leveling" and "conversion labor." These two errors brought the agriculture of the south from one of commodity agricultural economy back to one of self-sufficiency. Long An Province had Resolution 02 aimed at resolving the land problem and at this time, many results have been achieved but the problem is not yet completed. Whether you want to or not, it must be resolved because only with land stabilization will there be production stabilization. Internal purification is necessary with public presentation to the people before resolution is possible. Indiscriminate imprisonment will not resolve the problem but only add more fuel to the fire.

[Dr. Tran Minh Phung] Although I am a doctor, with my status as a National Assembly deputy in the province, I am most concerned about the land problem. I have visited many villages and seen that the living standards of the farmers are still low. We must have policies for encouraging production development in the rural area and respect the democratic rights of the people. Recently, I made a statement in a meeting of the Tien Giang People's Council about a woman who came to the local government of Chau Thanh District to complain and was taken into custody. I stated that this form cannot be used.

[Correspondent] Many of the voters have requested that the National Assembly remove a number of ministers from office who have insufficient ability or have issued erroneous policies. What is your opinion on this problem?

[Ly Chanh Trung] If an agreement is reached within the Municipal Delegation, it will present the issue of removing the Minister of Finance from office for lack of ability. The National Assembly has never dealt with this problem before. At the December 1985 session, many National Assembly deputies demanded the removal of those responsible for the currency exchange (September 1985) but it could not be done and a later announcement that a number of individuals had "relinquished their posts" was made before a succeeding session of the National Assembly.

[Dr. Ngoc Phuong] The issue of demanding removal from office will surely be presented at this session but it must be stated that procedures for removal are not easy because the responsibilities of those requiring dismissal must be clarified. By reports and statements made in teams and subcommittees, the consent and agreement of a majority of the deputies is necessary to halt implementation of the present erroneous tax policy, while simultaneously raising the issue of dismissing those who issued the erroneous policies.

[Correspondent] Are the difficulties in dismissal from office perhaps related to the present political mechanism that voters are suggesting be reorganized and renovated?

[Ly Chanh Trung] In my opinion, reorganization of the political structure is a prerequisite for recovery in every socioeconomic field and in democratization. Recently, slight progress was made in democratization and resistance to negativism but then it stopped abruptly. Resistance to negativism in the press has declined. The cutting edge has been turned. Even those criticized by the press are no longer afraid, and a literary unshackling precipitated the newspaper VAN NGHE case.

[Dr. Tran Minh Phung] "Use the people as the supporting base" is only often voiced. The people at the present time are still oppressed. I speak the truth, I still do not have democracy! At sessions of the National Assembly, delegation chiefs are controlled in acting smoothly with

both the top and bottom. It must be said that the Ho Chi Minh City National Assembly Delegation has developed democracy and the National Assembly is becoming better in the struggle for democracy but it is still weak, and has not yet fulfilled its mission. Truly, there are a number of gentlemen in the Council of Ministers that I do not trust. Why is it that a number of ministers failing to complete their mission in one ministry have been transferred to another ministry?

[Correspondent] I see the need for asking why the National Assembly cannot develop its constitutionally stipulated function as the agency with the highest state authority?

[Dr. Ngoc Phuong] A political and democratic mechanism must speak from the base of the party. The party is the party in power, the leader of the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the judicial agencies and Supreme Organ of Control. If the National Assembly is weak, how can the activities of the Council of Ministers be inspected and controlled with the party leading in policy and the agencies mentioned above equally powerful? Up to now, only the Council of Ministers has been the strongest. It has reached the point in which the National Assembly wishes to hold an additional session but the Ministry of Finance states that doing so would be too expensive and no session is held. Thus, the Ministry of Finance is deciding the activities of the National Assembly. Yes, if removal from office is necessary, I am the first to recognize the need for my removal because I am a Vice Chairman of the National Assembly and if unable to perform much National Assembly work, how can I have the time to understand the work of the Council of Ministers and the ministers?

[Correspondent] Should you be removed from office if your inability to do the job is due to the mechanism and not you?

[Dr. Ngoc Phuong] Yes, dismissal if due to the mechanism or correction of the mechanism. I believe that the party, specifically the Political Bureau, must strengthen elected agencies but elections should not follow a structural or overly crowded route. The National Assembly only needs 200 deputies, or there can be many people's deputies but with the election of a responsible National Assembly of 100 to 200 people of ability and concentrated on the job. The process of making laws and the laws must change, not waiting for submission by the Council of Ministers and adoption by the National Assembly. The party must discuss and decide a new political mechanism, ensuring that the National Assembly can achieve its function, with sufficient authority to inspect compliance with the law and the program of the Council of Ministers, and the authority to dismiss members of the Council of Ministers who are not completing their mission. At the present time, the Council of Ministers, like a soccer player kicking the ball out of bounds or into another's hands, is continuing to kick with no one to blow the whistle.

[Nguyen Van Thanh] The issue of democracy is an extremely great and constantly seething problem. State agencies elected by the National Assembly since 1986 have not yet successfully changed the socioeconomic situation. This indicates that a change in organization and personnel is essential at the present time.

[Correspondent] Finally, what problems do you see that must be presented at the National Assembly rostrum in the coming session?

[Ly Chanh Trung] The education policy issue is an acute problem that must be raised, in addition to those mentioned above.

[Ca Le Thuan] I will speak a great deal about the fields of ideology and culture which I think are an important issue. The economy will probably have a period for policy correction and a strategy is needed for building mankind. Even for the budget for science, education and culture, the National Assembly needs a new means of observation that originates from a viewpoint for mankind. New thinking on the role of mankind in social activities has not yet been expressed by specific policies.

[Nguyen Van Thanh] The problems of taxes and land are heated issues and neglecting them in sessions is irrational. These two problems must be placed within the primary theme of the session.

[Dr. Ngoc Phuong] The National Assembly must have a decisive opinion on industrial trade taxes and export-import duties, and issue a resolution that the Ministry of Finance at future sessions must present new draft bills for the National Assembly to pass, not contrary to the resolutions of the National Assembly. I will also raise the issues of public health, hospital fee and tuition collection, and resistance to state subsidization, including that in public health and education.

[Dr. Tran Minh Phung] The policy on public health and education is also an issue I will touch upon during this session.

Legal Seminar Examines Democracy, Development

42090108a Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 9 Dec 88 pp 1, 3

[Article by V.K.: "Seminar on Law Serving Democracy and Development: Current Law Still Does Not Ensure Democracy"]

[Text] At a seminar on "the law serving democracy and development" of the Municipal Lawyers Association that began on the afternoon of 6 December, the lawyers and legal cadres asserted that current law does not yet ensure achievement of the people's democratic rights.

Presently, development of the people's collective ownership rights through democratic agencies and mass organizations is not yet ensured. Because elections are still in form only and voters do not yet truly possess the conditions necessary for selection according to their wishes, revision of the laws on electing National Assembly deputies and people's council members is an urgent requirement. The role of the front and mass organizations at this time has also not yet been substantiated by law. In conjunction with that, the right to information and the rights to appeal and to sue are still not ensured by law. Because many agencies engaged in a mission of handling appeals and suits of the people have not operated in a complete and thorough manner, a law defining the responsibility of the state in public service actions harmful to the people is necessary.

Regarding the law serving social discipline, an opinion exists that the court decisions of the central government and the local area also still "kick" each other. Some court decisions of the central government may prohibit something but the local area still "breaks the rules," creating habits of noncompliance with the law and a psychology of disregarding the law.

In contributing their opinions on what to do for the law serving democracy, the lawyers stated that an urgent requirement exists for establishment of a political and social institution to serve democracy, and simultaneously proposed that the Municipal Party Committee emphasize legal research in systemizing the resolutions of the party, strengthening and supplementing the ranks of legal cadres, and soon establishing a legal college for the city to promptly meet legal cadre training requirements.

The seminar is continuing until the afternoon of 13 December with the theme of "the law serving development."

Democracy Discussed at Journalists Conference 42090107 Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 6 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by B.H.: "Fifth Conference (Fourth Session) of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association: Democracy and Enthusiasm"]

[Text] During the period 28 November-1 December 1988, the executive committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association held its fifth conference in Hanoi in order to review the activities of the association and discuss the preparations for the 5th Congress. The committee is composed of 53 members, of whom 41 were present at the conference. The 12 who were not present were Hoang Tung, Thanh Nho, Tran Cong Man, Hong Ha, Nguyen Van Duc, Nguyen Thi Van, Tran Dinh Hoe, Luu Thanh Tam, Nguyen Van Thuong, Ho Ngoc Huong, Tran Nang Tam (deceased), and Lan Anh.

The conference took place in an atmosphere of democracy and much greater enthusiasm than the previous four conferences. The members present took control of the conference, with 38 members presenting 69 papers. Of these, 21 people presented 1 paper, 10 people presented 2 papers, 6 people presented 3 papers, 1 person presented 4 papers, and 1 person presented 6 papers.

Evaluation of the Press and the Activities of the Association During the Past Year

On the morning of the first day of the conference, the delegates concentrated on the following topic: Recently, the press has made an effort to make changes, but in general, it has failed to satisfy the needs of the masses, party, democratization, and openness. Last year, many local newspapers boldly become involved in the struggle against negative aspects and gained the trust of their readers. The Journalists Association has changed the focus of its activities. Teach-ins and meetings to present awards have actively contributed to promoting the movement to make innovations in the press. Many of the views were concerned with analyzing a rather widespread situation: In many places, the party committee echelons have not helped the press to make innovations. There are still many difficulties in the relationship between the party committee echelons and the press, particularly in opposing negative aspects and making innovations regarding information. Many of the delegates expressed concern about something that is becoming more and more widespread: the different paths being taken by editors in chief. Specifically mentioned were the problems of the Kien Gian, Minh Hai, and Quang Ninh newspapers. The association executive committee must examine these based on the guideline of protecting the ranks of people who are publishing innovative newspapers. Of the 250 newspapers published nationwide from the central echelon to the localities, very few (about one in eight) have made innovations. Thus, there must be a mechanism to provide guarantees for the newspapers that are making innovations instead of letting them face this situation alone. Newspapers that try to make innovations usually encounter difficulties and face threats. But those newspapers that refuse to change have a much easier time, and in some cases, a number of committee echelons have said that they are doing the right thing.

In particular, remarks were made concerning the incident involving VAN NGHE. It was requested that the executive committee evaluate the credentials of VAN NGHE as a newspaper and member of the national press. On the afternoon of the first day of the conference, Tran Trong Tan, the head of the Department of Propaganda and Training of the Central Committee, came and summarized the main points concerning the Politburo's ideological work.

Problems Debated in Evaluating the Press Situation and the Association's Work During the Next 5 Years

Beginning on the second day of the conference, besides continuing to discuss the issues involving VAN NGHE, the delegates also discussed press work and the work of

the association in the next 5 years. They discussed the preparations that must be made for the coming 5th National Congress.

Almost all of the delegates said that since the 6th Congress, press activities have undergone positive changes that need to be recognized. Fundamental advances have been made in defining the functions and tasks of the press. The press is not only the voice of the party but also the people's ownership platform and the tool of the people's power. The press must not only communicate things to the people and stimulate them to take action but also make it possible for the people to "know, discuss, and control things." Many people confidently observed that democratizing society has defined more clearly the rights of the press and the people's freedom of speech. The press has escaped its previous fate. That is, it used to be regarded as a "servant in the house." The press has expanded its coverage of the news even though the existing news policy is very outdated and conservative. The press has bravely struggled against negative aspects and begun to regain the trust of readers. It has begun to mobilize the strength of public opinion. A rank of young, highly professional, and politically astute newspapermen has been formed. As for weaknesses, the delegates concentrated on analyzing and criticizing those newspapers that are still bound by the old way of thinking, the old system, and the conservative influences that are far removed from life and that have turned their backs on the requirements of the tasks and the needs of their readers. The conference divided the concerns of 10 ideas and concentrated on analyzing the huge gap between the committee echelons and the press. At different levels, members who are the editors in chief of local newspapers analyzed the great dependence, and sometimes total lack of independence, in carrying on activities. In particular, in cases in which newspapers oppose negative aspects, the committee echelons do not provide good support and even cover up the negative aspects. The delegates said that the attitude of the Vietnam Press Association should be one of taking responsibility in those cases in which editors in chief have been fired or threatened. Reflecting public opinion, many delegates said that there are fears that a rigid policy will be imposed not on weak newspapers that refuse to participate in making changes but on those newspapers that have gained the trust and attention of the public. Some proposed that there be a "roll call" of the newspapers and magazines and said that the association should propose dismissing a number of editors in chief who refuse to participate in the movement to make innovations and who are "asleep."

Those at the conference also discussed the fact that the press must report the news correctly and promptly to the leadership, an urgent need at a time when there are distortions because of inaccurate reports or bad tendencies. Some people said that the press must give attention to the activities aimed at changing theory, which is a basic and very difficult task in the struggle to change thinking. A number of people said that besides the fact

that democratization is creating difficulties that can be exploited by the enemy, attention must also be given to the fact that the conservative bureaucracy continues to engage in anarchic activities that do great damage to economic and social life. Some people said that we must strengthen foreign press work and give attention to the need for news of the almost 2 million Vietnamese living abroad.

There was much discussion concerning the functions of the Journalists Association, in which major changes have been made. Recently, the association has made positive changes to support the general movement. NGUOI LAM BAO must be improved. Many localities have not yet established provincial-level associations. An effort must be made to solve this problem. Even though it has tried, the association has not fulfilled its responsibility of protecting those newspapermen who have encountered obstacles in their profession or who have been attacked.

The association's new executive committee must be composed of talented newspapermen. With respect to the composition of the representatives, priority should be given to newspapermen who have recently shown progressive tendencies. Prior to the congress, there should be zone newspaper conferences and another meeting of the executive committee in order to examine the preparations for the congress.

The association's executive committee decided to convene the 5th Congress at the end of the second quarter of 1989. The congress will be carried on based on the motto "change, democracy, and solidarity." On the fourth day of the conference, both the morning and afternoon sessions were devoted to contributing ideas concerning drafting a press law.

The Problem That Was Debated for a Long Time: VAN NGHE

From the very first session, the delegates proposed supplementing the draft report on a striking incident that took place last year during the movement to make innovations in the press: the incident involving VAN NGHE. The discussion centered on the following points: VAN NGHE is part of the national press. People feel that it has contributed to democratization and that the Journalists Association must evaluate it properly. Readers in the localities are waiting to see what the attitude of the executive committee of the Journalists Association will be. Some said that the task of evaluating VAN NGHE must be handled very carefully in order to prevent people from thinking that the association is ignoring public opinion and stifling the movement to make innovations in the press. Some said that the recent decision by the Secretariat of the Journalists Association to praise three articles appearing in VAN NGHE ("Words of a Convict" by Tran Huy Quang, "The Whistle of a Train" by Nguyen Thi Van Anh, and "Heroism in the Face of Misfortune" by Hoang Minh Tuong) illustrates the attitude of evaluating the efforts

made by VAN NGHE to make innovations. In a letter sent to the conference by Thanh Nho, the vice president of the association, who was ill and could not attend the conference, the vice president said that the positive contributions made by VAN NGHE must be evaluated. After that, many others expressed their views concerning VAN NGHE. By the end of the third day of the conference, 20 delegates had expressed views on this.

On the afternoon of the second day of the conference, the Secretariat of the association disclosed a letter dated 27 November 1988 that Nguyen Ngoc, the editor in chief of VAN NGHE, had sent to the executive committee of the Journalists Association. The letter stated:

"Recently, as you all know, the executive committee of the Journalists Association harshly criticized VAN NGHE. Public reaction to this has been quite strong.

"For the past 2 years, even though VAN NGHE has had many shortcomings and made careless mistakes, it has nevertheless made great changes and made positive contributions to social and cultural life, particularly in the movement to change the country based on the spirit of the 6th Party Congress. The masses have welcomed these changes and contributions. VAN NGHE has become a positive element in the ranks of our newspapers and in the present struggle to make innovations.

"Because of this, evaluating and harassing VAN NGHE goes beyond VAN NGHE. This will have an important effect on press life in general and on democratization and the movement to make innovations.

"According to a reliable news source, I have learned that the Secretariat of the Journalists Association has decided to transfer the editor in chief of VAN NGHE.

"In view of what has happened to VAN NGHE recently, even a very simple-minded person can see that that "transfer" is really a form of disciplinary action. It is a disguised way of dismissing the editor in chief. This is improper.

"VAN NGHE is the organ of the Vietnam Writers Association and one of the newspapers in the ranks of our country's newspapers.

"I formally propose that the executive committee of the Vietnam Journalists Association consider this matter, because this is important not only to this newspaper but to newspapers in general. I suggest that the association respond to this in any way it feels appropriate."

On the morning of the third day of the conference, the delegates listened to Tran Trong Tan, who made additional comments on VAN NGHE. He read the letter by the Secretariat of the Writers Association transferring Nguyen Ngoc from his position as editor in chief of VAN NGHE to a position on the standing committee of the Committee To Prepare for the Congress. The official

letter from the Department of Propaganda and Training of the Central Committee replied that the department respects the decision of the Secretariat of the Writers Association. An urgent telegram sent from Ho Chi Minh City on 29 November 1988 by Nguyen Khai, the deputy secretary general of the Writers Association, stated: "I do not agree with replacing the editor in chief of VAN NGHE."

Just before noon on the third day of the conference, a very hot debate flared up on the VAN NGHE issue. Six of the seven speakers said that the executive committee of the Journalists Association must show an attitude of protecting the editor in chief of VAN NGHE. It cannot dodge or turn its back on this issue but must face the issue squarely. This is the way to treat the editor in chief of a newspaper that has made innovations. Attention must be given to public reaction both here and abroad. Only one person held a contrary view, saying that it isn't necessary to express an attitude, because Nguyen Ngoc has not been "attacked" or "killed."

In summary, after 3 days, during which 33 ideas were expressed during the course of 59 speeches (on the 4th day of the conference, 10 speakers discussed the draft press law), there was unanimous agreement that VAN NGHE had actively contributed to the movement to make changes in the press and that it had become involved with burning problems facing the people. For more than a year, it has attracted readers and gained their trust. Even though it has shortcomings and weaknesses, basically, this newspaper has participated in the movement to make changes. Only one person (who made the longest speech) said that even though it has made changes, VAN NGHE is guilty of "serious deviations." The delegates entrusted the Secretariat of the Journalists Association with the task of meeting with the Department of Propaganda and Training of the Central Committee in order to show their concern for the situation concerning VAN NGHE. They also asked it to meet with the Secretariat of the Writers Association to notify it of the ideas of the executive committee of the Journalists Association and to meet with Nguyen Ngoc and the VAN NGHE association branch in order to discuss the situation further.

When the conference notice was passed, many people attending the conference gave much attention to the VAN NGHE problem and expressed a very resolute attitude.

MILITARY

Export Processing Zone Project Takes Shape in HCM City
42090103b Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 1 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Kim Thach of the Municipal Industry and Commerce Liaison Committee: "Opinion: Project for an Export Processing Zone Is Taking Shape"]

[Text] The term, "export processing zone" (EPZ), has lately become familiar for the people of the municipality.

A number of reports in the press on the successful EPZ's in other countries aroused the curiosity of those who are interested in this very attractive form of foreign-trade economic activity.

The economists in Saigon are far from unfamiliar with the EPZ that had been established under the old regime: A cluster of industrial plants had been built in a separate area near the Port of Saigon to process a number of export goods for foreign capitalists.

After having been separated from the capitalist economic system for more than a decade, we have now learned that many countries around us in the last 10 years succeeded in developing their economies at an excessively fast pace. By adopting an open-door policy and dealing with the outside world in many attractive forms of investment, the underdeveloped countries, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong, have quickly moved forward by setting up EPZ's. Or the special economic zones, such as China's Shenzhen Zone which has been successfully tested since 1979, have become a model that is being developed on a much larger scale.

It is indeed not very hard to understand the meaning and persuading power of EPZ's for those countries that build their economies from poor starting points, such as our country today, where there are shortages of capital, materials, and scientific and technical knowledge, but there are strengths in terms of labor, land, and international geographical position. A cooperation aimed at investment at home and abroad for the purpose of exploiting the potential of each side on the basis of both sides benefiting from it and promoting the development of each country's economy is the wisest economic policy.

The economic line adopted by our state on dealing with foreign countries, the Investment Law that was born nearly a year ago, and the newly-promulgated Decree 139 of the Council of Ministers have truly opened the door for foreign investors, particularly the countries in the capitalist bloc. According to a survey, foreign capitalists in general like to invest in Vietnam, provided that we just adopt appropriate policies. In the initial stage, the EPZ being granted a special status is the most appropriate form for foreign investors to invest on a medium scale.

Ho Chi Minh City, the center of economic contact with the ASEAN countries and the capitalist bloc, has been authorized to set up EPZ's on a trial basis by applying the successful models of the countries in the region in conformity with Vietnam's economic and political characteristics. Economic and financial workers have been asked by the Municipal CPV Committee to propose the most persuasive plans so as to arrive soon at the establishment of EPZ's in the municipality. And the Municipal CPV Committee has also adopted zoning rules for suitable areas for construction of EPZ's to facilitate their future development.

One of the EPZ projects has been submitted by a group of well-known economists to the leaders of the municipality and has drawn the interest of the secretary of the Municipal CPV Committee. It is the project for establishing the *Saigon Export Processing Zone*, with the text of the provisional regulations and statutes of a *Saigon Export Processing Zone Trusteeship Corporation*. The project was the result of the intellectual contributions of many economic and financial experts and many import-export workers, as well as economic management cadres, including some enthusiastic retired cadres.

A meeting of the group that originally submitted the project, which was enlarged to include nearly 50 people who are interested in the subject matter, was held in the evening of 5 November at the office of the Industry and Commerce Liaison Committee. Participants were briefed about the Saigon EPZ project and had an opportunity to look at the overall blueprint (about 800 hectares), as well as learned about the formula and measures for mobilizing invested capital to build the infrastructural base (about 100 million dollars).

What is noteworthy is that the Saigon EPZ will not solely be a processing zone to make goods for export with both the "entry end and exit end" being possessions of foreign investors, but rather an international special economic zone to look like a small city, with the perfected state management and economic management machinery and service installations serving a large industrial production center (about 600 factories and 60,000 workers), and will combine investment by foreigners with domestic investment and making export goods for foreign investors with exporting and importing raw materials and goods on the spot in accordance with state plans. Preliminary calculations of economic results show that if the project is fully carried out, it will bring about 150 million dollars to the state each year, in addition to many other economic advantages.

As the project authors now foresee, if the municipality approves and permits perfecting the establishment of the Saigon Export Processing Zone Trusteeship Corporation between now and the end of 1988, the construction of the infrastructural base can be partially started at the beginning of the third quarter of 1989 and a number of factories will appear in this processing zone by the middle of 1990, with construction being continued and more factories becoming operational one by one until total completion projected for the end of 1992.

We hope that within not too distant a future, many EPZ's, along with many factories and foreign investment projects, would make their appearance in our country and create a sound foundation for Vietnam's economy to take off.

November 1988

Bac Thai Combats Substandard Recruiting

42090114 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 2 Dec 88 p 2

[Article by Ho Anh Thang: "Bac Thai Overcomes Problem of Poor Quality Inductees"]

[Text] During the past few years, no reduction has occurred in the number of disciplinary infractions in troop units. It is a concern of the command cadres. There are many reasons for these violations of discipline, including factors of society and life, but one direct cause is the present low quality of inductees. An army must be an organization comprised of outstanding youths with good quality moral and cultural standards. To have such an army, the military "plunge" must be given special attention by all society, first of all cadres in all levels and sectors in the local area. For a fairly long time, because of our imprecise viewpoint that the "army is a big school," a number of agencies and localities enlisted wayward and backward youths so the army could "educate them." Some localities even sent youths with police records and past histories of failing to reform and become good citizens.

We have investigated the quality of a number of recruiting campaigns during the past few years in Bac Thai, a province with both lowlands and highlands, both central and local industrial agencies and with many different ethnic minorities living together. During the past several years, the province has overcome difficulties to conduct good recruiting campaigns. The troops from Bac Thai are primarily assigned to combat and combat readiness units on the northern frontier. Since 1985, troops from the province have also been delivered every year to eight or nine unit centers. Despite many difficulties, the province has met its quota each year and tried for increasingly higher quality.

Looking back over the past 3 years, the recruiting efforts of Bac Thai have overcome quality deficiencies. However, due to poor coordination between recruiting agencies and the lack of responsibility of a number of localities, backward youths with poor moral qualities are still being sent into the army. Major Mai Van Cuong, chief of the recruiting section of the Bac Thai Military Command, stated that an extremely high percentage of the recruits are youth union members, but some localities in their recruiting efforts are still conducting large scale youth union admissions to "motivate" the men. As a result, upon completion of their military obligations and return to the local area, 70 percent of the troops abandon their youth union activities. Some rare cases have occurred such as a soldier in Communications Unit SO1 who had previously served in the public security forces, was disciplined and sent home, had his personal file rewritten by the local area, and was sent into the army. This soldier gathered with a number of other nonprogressive soldiers in the unit who had committed many military and civilian disciplinary infractions. In another unit, Captain Hoang Phi said that his unit also

had a number of cases in which local areas sent substandard youths. There was even one who broke the law six times before he entered the army and who deserted 3 days after he reached the unit. Some have engaged in smuggling and picking pockets. Such cases are rare but sufficient to recognize the danger that entry of a youth lacking quality and ethics to the army creates no small adverse effect on the unit. Youths entering the army who are of good quality but not yet tempered and challenged can easily be led astray by inferior elements.

Generally speaking, there are still a number of local agencies in the annual recruiting drives that only emphasize delivery of sufficient troops to meet the quota while lacking attention to the political and social qualities and the health of the recruits. Nearly every drive has a fairly large number of cases in which recruits must be returned due to poor health, or because their personal histories are unclear. Ethnic minority youths from the highland districts often have low cultural levels but declaring these levels higher creates difficulties for units in arranging, managing and using the men.

Especially under present conditions, with the policies for stimulating development of the five economic elements, recruiting is confronted with many difficulties to be examined and resolved. Some agencies and enterprises, because of their own production interests, have retained youths with good morals, qualities and health while sending only the average or substandard into the army. Cases have occurred of privately operated or family production facilities sending replacements for physical examinations. Cases of resisting recruiting examination orders, fleeing, or drinking medicine to falsify health examinations have also happened in Bac Thai. Phu Luong District had 13 recruits returned due to poor health or invalid personal file procedures. A number of localities, agencies and enterprises continue to accept army deserters for contract work or a normal job and life without prosecution. Pho Yen District allowed a deserter to depart for cooperative labor in a foreign country, a case discovered by the Recruiting Council.

The investigation indicated that recruiting quality in the rural area is usually better than in the cities, especially in political quality. Rural youths and the sons of workers and public servants are usually better than the sons of families engaged in free occupations on the street. This also proves that the family and social environment has a direct influence on the character development of each youth, and must be a concern of local areas and units during recruitment.

To resolve the present situation of poor recruiting quality, Bac Thai has made efforts for solutions from the very root of selection for the "plunge" into the army. Since 1987, recruiting agencies have coordinated with sectors and local areas in forming units to inspect recruiting quality, comprised of recruiting, court, public security, etc. cadres, for a total inspection of each man. A number of localities, to ensure fairness and democracy, have

posted recruiting preparation rosters like voter registration lists for all the people to know and to uncover occurrences of erroneous recruiting and appeals. Previously, the district level draft council usually assigned norms for each drive to the villages but now each village positively reviews each individual and then reports to the district. Only based on the quantity and quality reported by the village does the district assign norms to the village specific to each individual. Along with special attention to political quality, great emphasis is given to cultural and health levels. During 1988, health category A3 accounted for only 18.06 percent and the level 1 cultural levels accounted for only 3.7 percent. The district draft council coordinates with the statistics agency to ascertain the capabilities and number of youths with sufficient enlistment standards, and based upon that, establishes recruiting norms for the local areas. Firmly coordinating with agencies, sectors and localities, Bac Thai Province has applied forms of conscientiousness in conjunction with administrative methods to educate recruits. Local areas are recruiting primarily young and healthy youths and during 1988, the number of recruits older than 22 accounted for only 9.5 percent. In addition, methods of resolute prosecution have been applied against youths evading their military obligations as well as those deserting to the local area. Thanks to these methods, the quality of recruiting during 1988 in Bac Thai began to achieve good results and the number of recruits returned for insufficient standards accounted for only 2 percent. Enlisting youths with sufficient moral, health and cultural standards is a requirement in Bac Thai at the present time, and we think it is a lesson in experience for the local areas.

ECONOMIC

NHAN DAN Discusses New Economic Zones
BK0302132389 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
24 Jan 89 pp 1, 4

[Text] Some people have recently raised the question of whether or not it is necessary to continually redistribute the labor force and population in order to build new economic zones? Their reasoning is that this task has been less effective in the recent past. Moreover, in the course of renovation, encouraging non-governmental economic components to develop and the expansion of labor cooperation with foreign countries have helped create new jobs for workers.

If we look at the 20 percent of those people relocated to new economic zones who have now returned home, or at the number of hundreds of thousands of hectares of reclaimed virgin land which lie fallow now, and at the tens of thousands of hectares of forest which have been destroyed mostly by "the new economic zone people," the question seems to have some grounds.

What, then, have we done over the past 13 years?

Create New Populous Economic Centers

From 1976 to 1980 1.5 million people, including 750,000 workers, and from 1981 to 1987 1.9 million more people (including 897,000 workers), answered the party's call and left their homes for thinly populated areas with the purpose of building new populous economic centers in order to carry out the socioeconomic and national defense tasks.

The purpose of relocating millions of people from populous plains to vast thinly populated regions, and of motivating ethnic minority people of all nationalities in mountainous regions to settle down to farm is to effectively exploit all resources of the country while building a new civilized society so that the mountainous regions can catch up with the lowlands. Our party and state have long asserted that this a strategic task in the initial stage of socialist construction. Correctly realizing this task, in the wake of the sixth party congress many provinces have considered this a program having a direct impact on the implementation of three major economic programs set forth by the sixth party congress. Thai Binh and Ha Nam Ninh provinces which have formulated additional programs for population and workers, have long been relocating people to new economic zones.

For the past 30 years or so, cadres, party members and people in Ha Nam Ninh Province have contributed their manpower and material assets to building a second country for them. Some 600,000 or more people (20 percent of the provincial population) in Ha Nam Ninh province have left their native places for new lands to build 400 agricultural cooperatives, 35 production collectives, and 20 new villages; provide workers to 19 agricultural farms and afforestation sites, and reclaim and put into production 9,844 hectares of land. The Ha Nam Ninh people in Minh Hai Province have annually produced 20,000 tonnes of grain, 5,500 tonnes of salt, 350 tonnes of fish and 1,200 tonnes of pork. In Lam Dong Province, they have produced annually a supplement of 16,200 tonnes of grain, 850 tonnes of assorted vegetables, 1,500 tonnes of coffee and 4,500 tonnes of pork. In Tran Yen district (Hoang Lien Son Province), they have established 12 cooperatives, reclaimed 2,000 hectares of land for cultivation, and produced annually for this mountainous province a supplement of 25,000 tonnes of grain, 2,000 tonnes of fine tea, and nearly 10,000 head of cattle.

In 20 years (1968-88), Ha Son Binh Province also made great efforts to redistribute the labor force and population. Some 85,000 people in the province have left their native places for Bac Thai, Song Be, Duc Lac, Lam Dong provinces...

than 3,000 people from various populated villages voluntarily came here to establish two new villages and four agricultural cooperatives with capital of \$4 million Dong (1980) including 10 million Dong of state assistance and nearly 44 million from the municipality (the district contributed 15 million Dong and 7 million man-days). Gia Minh has now become a new populous economic center with relatively good material bases: 15 km of protective dike against saline water, 18.5 km of canal to irrigate crops, 8 km of newly open roads, 4 electric pump stations, 5 km of electric distribution line and 1 electric transformer. The district has reclaimed 477 hectares of virgin land for production. The yearly cultivated area is 763 hectares, yielding 2,000 tonnes of rice. We must know that the per capita cultivated area in Thuy Nguyen District is 360 square meters to appreciate the land area reclaimed by Gia Minh over the past years.

Areas of Goods Production

In the past few years, efforts have been concentrated on relocating the workforce and population to areas of perennial industrial crops and definite results have been obtained. From 1981 to 1987, the rubber plantation sector received 348,000 more people including 175,000 workers. The sector has shifted from relocating single people to relocating families and has linked production to building populated areas in order to have a direct impact on the new areas of rubber plantings. During the 1976-80 period, 19,000 hectares of new trees were grown and from 1981 to 1988, more than 80,000 hectares were planted of which 4,500 hectares have been tapped for business.

With regard to the coffee sector, it has received an additional 80,000 people, including 43,000 laborers, over the past 8 years. The coffee area increased from 22,000 hectares (in 1980) to 80,000 hectares (in 1987) and yield is up more than three fold. In the Central Highlands, the renovation of the population structure has had a strong impact on the restructuring of the economy. It has concentrated on turning out marketable farm produce for export such as coffee, pepper, rubber, peanuts, and legumes of all sorts. In Duc Lac Province alone, along with the expansion of those coffee areas owned by state farms, cooperatives, and production collectives, the coffee areas owned by the people have developed very fast. The entire province now has 16,603 hectares of coffee plantation owned by the people. The state has bought coffee for export from coffee plantations owned by the people and the quantities purchased have, in certain years, reached as many as 5,000 metric tons.

The Central Highlands has welcomed an additional 80,000 new economic resettlers. This is an important

education and 13,000 intermediate-level technical cadres. Various models in carrying out intensive cultivation of water rice in Sa Thay (Gia Lai-Cong Tum) and in Da Hoai, Da Te, and Cat Tien (Lam Dong), and in Chu Co Nia (Dac Lac) are truly the fruits harvested by those new economic resettlers coming from Thanh Hoa, Nghe Tinh, Nghia Binh, and Ha Nam Ninh provinces.

But There Has Been Failure and Waste

Apart from those successes in the redistribution of labor and population on a national scale, there have been failures and waste, and the root cause of the failure has been ascribed to such things as impatience and hastiness, the people being sent to new economic zones en masse, careless area surveys, the people being sent to areas lacking basic conditions for production—water shortage and difficulties in travel—unsatisfactory prevention and treatment of diseases, and the malaria death toll. The change in organization from the General Department for Reclamation of Wasteland to the Steering Committee for Redistribution of Labor and Population, and then to the present Department for Mobilization of Labor and Population (belonging to the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare) has interrupted this work. Departing from only one leadership center—that provided leadership for both the departure link (the place from which the people go) and the arrival link (the locality that welcomes the resettlers) and uniformly assigned plan norms for various things such as capital, materials, transportation means, foodgrain, etc.—we now have scattered this task in various ministries, sectors, and localities, thus leading to rifts and disunity within the internal ranks which were so severe that the entire organization had to be dissolved. The leadership apparatus in various localities has not been uniform and for decades now the capital invested has not been settled, balanced, and reviewed. There has been a failure to select models and to calculate work efficiency. Monthly informative work has been slow. Even worse, there has been no review of the national situation for 3 months. Although large in number, the contingent of sectoral cadres has not been strong enough. They are professionally weak and they have not concerned themselves with their work. There has been little effort to formulate policies for mobilization of the population to go to new economic zones. Investment efforts have been scattered and wasteful; spending has been great. Hundreds of state farms in the Mekong River Delta have been dissolved and the life of hundreds of thousands of people has been unstable for many years now. The policy of choosing a rational mobilization system with enough managerial and technical cadres, teachers, physicians, technical workers, and practitioners of traditional professions seems to still to be in limbo. Among those laborers already sent away, there are no small number of poor families which lack production experiences. A number of them are reported to have been chronically indebted even when they were in their native places.

These shortcomings do not mean that the redistribution of labor and population has lost its historic role, but the

main reason has been the lack of appropriate attention given to directing work implementation.

It Is Vital That We Make Corrections for Progress

The redistribution of populated areas must be linked with the history of development of each ethnic group and this work has been seen everywhere, not only in our country. To achieve economic development and a stabilized life, it is necessary to solve the employment problem. Our party and state's policy of linking labor with land in order to create jobs is a correct, practical, and the cheapest way by which each person and each establishment can take care of themselves and contribute to overcoming the difficulties now confronting the country. The sending of people to new economic zones over the past 30 years has proved this fact. The three objectives of this task (economic, social welfare, and national defense) have been achieved in various areas. Only with such a comprehensive and practical concept can we be determined to iron out existing difficulties. We must, on the one hand, guard against feelings of impatience and hastiness and, on the other, refrain from feeling pessimistic and frustrated, for this will lead us to neglecting this truly strategic task. We must continue to build new economic zones in a more steadfast and effective manner.

SOCIAL

Council of Ministers Sets Limit of Two Children Per Family

42090109a Hanoi GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 5 Dec 88 pp 1, 3

[Article: "Council of Ministers Decision 162 Concerning a Number of Population and Family Planning Policies"]

[Text] Population planning is very important in the socio-economic development of the country and in raising the standard of living.

To rapidly reduce our country's rate of population growth, with the immediate goal being achieving a natural population growth rate of 1.7 percent by 1990 as recorded in the resolution of the 6th Congress of the CPV and the resolution of the second session of the 8th National Assembly, the Council of Ministers has made the following number of specific decisions concerning population and family planning policy:

Article 1—Practicing family planning is the responsibility of all society, of male as well as female citizens, beginning with the ministries and the people's committees on the various levels, whose responsibility it is to provide day to day guidance.

Article 2—The number of children per couple:

a) Persons in the following categories and persons who live in the following areas are permitted to have a maximum of two children:

—Cadres, manual workers and civil servants at agencies of the party, the state and mass organizations and cadres and soldiers of the armed forces;

—Families who live in a municipality, a city or an industrial zone;

—Families who live in the Red River Delta, the Mekong Delta, the lowlands of the central coastal provinces or the midlands.

b) Families of the ethnic minorities in the mountain provinces of the North, the Central Highlands and the Northwest may have a maximum of three children per couple.

c) Couples who were married previously, either one or both of whom have children from their previous marriage, who now wish to have a child of their own may have only one child.

d) In cases in which twins or triplets are born to the couple first, they may not have another child. Couples who already have one child but then give birth to twins or triplets will not be considered as having exceeded the limit.

e) Persons who have two children, both of whom are handicapped, may have a third child.

f) The above mentioned families of cadres, members of the armed forces, manual workers and civil servants are families in which both the husband and wife are a cadre, manual worker or civil servant or only one person is a cadre, manual worker, civil servant or member of the armed forces. The place of residence of the mother is used to determine if a family lives in a municipality, city or industrial zone.

Article 3—Child bearing age and the space between children:

a) In the case of families residing in municipalities, cities and industrial zones in which the husband or wife is a cadre, a member of the armed forces, a manual worker or a civil servant, child bearing age is 22 years of age or older for women and 24 years of age or older for men. In the other areas, the age is 19 or older for women and 21 or older for men.

b) The second child, if any, and the first child must be spaced 3 to 5 years apart. In the case of a woman who gives birth late in life, after 30 years of age, the space can be 2 to 3 years.

Article 4—Registration and childbirth management:

a) Couples who already have a child (except couples who have stopped having children) and newly married couples must register with the local administration and pledge to practice family planning in exact accordance with Articles 2 and 3. Cadres, manual workers, civil servants and members of the armed forces are to register at their agency or unit. Civilians are to register at their village, subward or town people's committee.

b) Agencies, units and village, subward and town people's committees must routinely keep abreast of the specific situation concerning the implementation of birth control measures and the birth of children by each couple within their agency, unit or locality.

c) Agencies and units must report on the family planning situation within their agency or unit and be under the supervision and inspection of the people's committee on the basic level and the population and family planning guidance committee of the precinct, district or town.

Article 5—Measures for promoting population work and family planning.

a) Efforts must be intensified to provide widespread propaganda and education of every form concerning population and family planning so that everyone clearly understands the benefits to be derived and the responsibility to teach about population and family planning within general schools, colleges, vocational schools and cadre training schools.

b) It is necessary to strengthen the system of organizations engaged in population and family planning work on the various levels so that they have an adequate number of specialized and semi-specialized cadres. Every agency and unit must put a cadre in charge of population work and family planning.

c) A full supply of equipment, implements and drugs as well as an adequate force of specialized public health cadres must be prepared in order to promptly meet the needs for gynecological examinations and medical treatment and birth control and abortion services. It is necessary to organize basic public health service units which are convenient to the people and provide instruction in the use of safe and effective birth control measures and methods suited to the habits of each area and to each person.

d) The Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Commission, economic organizations and the people's committees of the provinces, municipalities, special zone, precincts, wards, districts and cities must provide appropriate funding to the population committee on their level in order to provide the conditions needed for the committee to perform its population and family planning work well.

Article 6—Policies and regulations encouraging population work and family planning:

1. Henceforth, one of the standards to be considered in the allocation of land for the construction of a house and the distribution of housing is that the family have two children.

The same standards apply to families that have only one child as apply to families that have two children.

Families that have more than the allowed number of children (which includes the children they already have) must pay a housing or land rent calculated at a high price for the extra space they request.

2. Henceforth, families with three children or more will not be permitted to move into the urban centers of municipalities, cities and industrial zones.

3. Families that have more than the stipulated number of children must contribute social support funds, which include funds for education and health care and an increased contribution of socially beneficial labor.

4. The state will supply, free of charge, birth control devices, such as intrauterine loops and condoms, birth control pills and public health services for the insertion of intrauterine loops and abortions to eligible persons who are cadres, manual workers, civil servants or members of the armed forces, persons to whom priority is given under policy and poor persons who register to practice family planning.

5. The widespread sale of birth control devices will be permitted in order to facilitate their use by everyone who needs them.

6. If they desire to have children, childless women may receive medical treatment to enable them to bear a child.

7. The state shall adopt regulations offering incentives to encourage persons to cease child bearing by means of vasectomies and tubal ligations.

8. When examining the results of the implementation of their plan, state agencies as well as production and business units must give consideration to another standard, namely, meeting the norms on population and family planning.

9. Couples which do not observe the articles concerning the number of children will be appropriately penalized in accordance with current law by their immediate management agencies.

Article 7—The provisions of this decision become effective 3 months after the day they are signed by the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

On the basis of this decision, the National Population and Family Planning Commission, the ministries and the people's committees of the provinces and the municipalities and special zone directly subordinate to the central level will guide specific enforcement within the scope of their responsibility.

Cuu Long Province Tries To Settle Land Disputes
42090113 Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese
5, 6 Dec 88

[Article by The Gia: "Settling the Land Disputes in Cuu Long Province"]

[5 Dec 88, pp 1, 4]

[Text] I. Democratization, Publicization

Cuu Long Province is one of the localities where land problems have surfaced at the earliest time.

Many farmer households there submitted petitions as early as at the end of 1987 and recently came in person to the headquarters of provincial organs and to Ho Chi Minh City to raise the question of claiming land and asking to return to their old land.

In early August 1988, the Cuu Long Provincial CPV Committee actively implemented Directive No 30 aimed at quickly stabilizing the situation. A month later, thoroughly understanding Directive No 47 of the Political Bureau, the Cuu Long party organization reinforced its confidence as it was doing everything possible to apply it to the real situation in its locality. The position of the Provincial CPV Committee was to settle the land disputes among farmer households in production collectives and cooperatives and to link it with making the assignment of on-contract land fairer and more rational on the basis of recognizing the fact that there were differences in the amount of land tilled by farmer households; encouraging the households that had cash, capabilities, and experiences to accept more land to till; and limiting the number of farmer households having no land to till and no longer letting any households be deprived of land. It was aimed at stabilizing production and consolidating production collectives and cooperatives. An outstanding characteristic of Cuu Long Province is that it has little cultivable land while its population is too large. The upper middle farmers who have a lot of excess land account for about 2-5 percent of the farmer population. The great majority of farmers are middle-class ones, whose land has been distributed by the revolution through many periods; if they had some excess land, it was just beyond the amount of on-contract land normally assigned in accordance with quotas by the locality. So, with land availability being that limited, there was no way for the province to solve the land disputes other than working on a case-by-case basis and in a very rational and sentimental manner in the spirit of "sharing food and clothing" between the households that had excess land and the ones that were short of land or had none to till.

The approach adopted by Cuu Long Province originated from the actual experiences it had learned in the course of solving the land disputes in the earliest "hot spot" there.

Huu Thanh Village (Tra On District) has 4 hamlets and 1,612 farmer households working 1,084 hectares of land. Its land, which has repeatedly gone through changes, is generally divided into four categories: land supplied by the revolution; land taken from its owners by the old regime; land that has been legally sold and bought, inherited land, land given by owners to their children or grandchildren; and land bought or occupied by force. In the past years, the village administration had failed to totally wipe out exploitation by the feudal landlords and rural bourgeois, which led to an unclear situation. In 1985, it brought farmers into 35 production collectives in a massive move, which was combined with making land adjustments. That gave rise to a number of land disputes. On the basis of the assigning quotas, the village as a whole had 319 households having excess land (a total of 120 hectares), with the smallest excess being 800 square meters, and the largest 30 cong [i.e., 1,000 square meters). The majority of households had excesses ranging from 2 to 3 cong. There were 910 households having the full amount of land, 326 households having not enough land, and 57 having no land at all. When raking and leveling was assigned, with the assignment being done in the manner of imposing it by orders and force, the households that had excess land felt as if land had been taken from them, which led to quarrels and a loss of solidarity among farmers. In the last few years, as collectivized work was started, the village party organization and administration made many efforts to provide leadership over local socioeconomic development, to improve the soil, to build a water conservancy system in the fields, and to change the crop cultivation pattern. All of the village's land was used to grow crops not only in the tenth-month, summer, and autumn seasons, which were unsure, but also in the winter-spring season to ensure having good crops with high yield. Farmers felt that land was becoming precious, which served as a psychological motivation leading to a stronger desire to get more land to till. Pham Van Loc, secretary of the village's party chapter, said that the village had about 1,600 farmer households and that almost all of them did want to have more land to till, a desire that could not be satisfied because of the limited amount of land the village had. Of 257 suits and legal complaints about land almost all were claims for return of previously-owned land, and only 11 petitions were about land deliberately seized only recently by 11 households from 32 households that had been assigned to till it.

As we read the petitions in those law suits, listened directly to the farmers' explanations, and studied the reports of the village's leaders, we understood more clearly one thing: The present land disputes have originated from an insufficient understanding of the new policy of the party and state in connection with the wrongdoings at the basic level. The farmers' request for

a fair and rational solution of such land disputes originated from their working capacity and their desire to develop production. But because of different interests different classes of farmers understood and accepted the policy in a different manner; in addition, the psychological interaction among them further increased the number of people who brought forth "demands for land." In Huu Thanh Village, at first, in July 1988, only 30 households went to Ho Chi Minh City to present their demands (6 households who had lost some land under the old regime succeeded in taking with them 20 more households, including a family of revolutionaries being willing to come along, too). From that start, the village subsequently had nearly 300 suits.

Implementing the directives from the CPV Central Committee, the province and district promptly sent a group of cadres to the village to join with the village party organization and administration in holding direct discussions with the farmers concerned to settle their claims. Through an experimental work, the province found that the party and administration in the village had in the past failed to show an appropriate interest in educating and carefully explaining to cadres, party members, and farmers there about a correct understanding of the land issue and the realities in the countryside, nor to discover on a timely basis any new problems that they could talk about and resolve. The experience of Huu Thanh Village pointed to this fact: A decisive first step would be to bring about, through campaigning and education in the party organization as a whole and the people, a correct understanding of the positions and policies of the party and the state laws, as well as to give them peace of mind. Here, after the farmers had thoroughly understood the spirit of Directive 47 of the Political Bureau and the Land Law, the majority of them supported the policy of settling the land disputes in the manner suggested by the party. On the cadres' side, they criticized themselves in a sincere manner and admitted that they had been undemocratic by failing to hold open discussions with farmers, a shortcoming that made them think that the administration had been taking land from one person and distributing it to another and thus sowing doubts in their mind. Dealing with the question of making adjustment in connection with assigning land, this time the village party organization and administration adopted the formula of being open and democratic, letting the people really discuss things with one another, and the administration just mediating, leading any basic investigation, and presenting adjustment plans for farmers to choose. Many groups conducted separate investigations of the use of land by the households; obtained a sound knowledge of the origin of land, the effectiveness of the use of assigned land, and the fulfillment of obligation toward the state by each farmer household; and discovered the cases of assigning land to the wrong people, as well as the negative acts committed by cadres, party members, and management boards of collectives. After having carefully completed the above-mentioned steps, the collectives drafted assigned-land adjustment plans (for three kinds of households: assigned land to be

either taken back or reduced; assigned land to remain the same; or additional land to be assigned). On the basis of keeping the land fund open, a conference of collective members was held to organize farmers for participating in democratic discussions, examining the adjustment plans, and voluntarily selecting a rational plan and to arrive at a vote on each and every case. That was the basis for the administration to issue the 15-year land-use documents, in compliance with Resolution 10.

The farmer households that had enough land, were short of land, and had none to till accounted for 81 percent of all farmer households in Huu Thanh Village. The ones that had excesses of land (319 households), including 10 in the upper middle group, accounted for 19 percent. In addition to ricefields, they also had 6-10 cong of gardens, digging machines, threshers, and in some cases even rice-grinding machines, with the standard of living being rather high. Nearly 300 intermediate and lower middle farmer households, having excesses of just a few cong of land compared to the assignment quotas, were fully capable of tilling the excess land by using their own capital, energy, and experience. If the middle farmer households, particularly the upper ones, firmly asked for the return of all excess land, it would be an equally irrational thing to do. The reason was that other households, including hundreds of families being within the scope of the policy, would be short of land. As a result, many middle farmer households, particularly the upper ones, voluntarily pledged to act in the "sharing food and clothing" spirit in favor of the households having little land and thus to ensure solidarity in the countryside. In the actual adjustment made this time, the village as a whole took 14.7 cong from the three households that had received more assigned land by cheating. It also reduced the land that had been assigned to 319 households beyond their ability to till (by 79.72 hectares) and assigned additional land (59.71 hectares) to 296 households having capital and experience, as well as a need for boosting production. The households that had excess land gave up 21 hectares of land, which was then assigned to other households. Many households still retained the same assigned land; a wounded soldier's household voluntarily returned the assigned land and switched to another occupation.

The land disputes in Huu Thanh Village were thus temporarily settled, but it does not mean that all suits and complaints have disappeared. The village has learned from its experience in order to patiently deal with each and every case. In fact, after the collectives have approved the assigned-land adjustment plan, there still remain 21 suits and complaints; 13 collectives must hold a conference to reconsider each and every case. So far six households have remained firm in claiming their previously-owned land, no matter of what origin it might have been, and in spite of the efforts other households repeatedly made to persuade them to do otherwise. If no measures are taken to settle their claims once for all in a manner that satisfies all legal, moral, and psychological requirements, from these households the claims can spread to others and will become a

situation that some local cadres call a "flare-up of the disease." Everybody sees that although the land disputes in Huu Thanh Village have been satisfactorily settled in an initial move, the basic matter lies in the fact that its land fund is limited and its population increases in a fast pace while other occupations have not been fully developed yet. The village's CPV Committee and administration have seen the following: The basic and long-term solution to the land problem is to exploit more effectively the existing land, to actively redistribute labor, and to strive to develop more occupations in the countryside.

[6 Dec, p 1]

[Text] II. Eliminating Trouble or Satisfying the People's Will?

Nguyet Lang B Hamlet (Binh Phu Village in Cang Long District) had a creative way to do things. The hamlet has 332 farmer households, mostly people of Khmer origin, working 290 hectares of land. Immediately following the liberation, almost all of its land was in the hands of middle farmer households. The household that had the most land had 70 cong; the majority of cadres had 20-30 cong. Meanwhile, 55 landless households had to earn their living by working for other people. The village administration succeeded in asking 34 households to let those 55 households have 213 cong of payoff land. When it issued land-assigning contracts, Nguyen Lang B Hamlet adopted the policy of assigning the same amount of land throughout the hamlet in accordance with the quota of 2.8 cong and awarding contracts by drawing numbers, which led to uniform raking and leveling, and mixed cultivation being practiced in the entire hamlet. An irrational situation resulted from some households in one collective having to accept their assigned land in another collective, or other households being assigned land very far from their home and having to pay a gia [equal to 20 kilograms] of paddy a day for renting motorboat to carry paddy home during harvest time. Over a year ago, the ethnic minority people were angered by the fact that as the result of 2 hamlets agreeing to till each other's land, 37 households in Nguyet Lang B Hamlet had to return to their hamlet to accept 215 cong of poor land after the good land that they had been tilling in another hamlet had been taken from them. Recently, the fact that the situation in which farmers claimed more land and demanded to return to their old land was getting worse created confusion among almost all households, and in turn embarrassed the village administration.

Implementing Directive 47, the CPV Committee and administration of Binh Phu Village had initially adopted the policy of keeping the status quo of its eight collectives, making land assignment adjustments among the households that would get either more or less land, and in only specific cases allowing people to return to their old land so as to avoid any disturbances that could happen to the neighboring hamlets, which had just resolved their own problems in a satisfactory manner.

The aspirations and mentality of the ethnic minority people were such that they would want to return to their old land. Farmers said in a plain language: "I hold my infant in my arms, but it will be hard to hold another person's infant." In order to stabilize production and not to have any trouble in the future, the CPV Committee and administration of Binh Phu Village boldly chose a new plan, which is completely different from the initial plan: The eight collectives of Nguyet Lang B Hamlet were assigned land anew in accordance with the situation prior to the assignment of land for mixed cultivation. Then the land fund was balanced, with rational assignment made in favor of all households and with the extent of adjustments being limited to a hamlet, to avoid any spreading to other hamlets. That plan was approved by all production collectives following democratic discussions among them. Because of that reassigning of land to the collectives, all 309 households returned to the old land and received all of the land that had been assigned to them before. The 18.4 cong that had been left unused by 2 households were taken back, and new land was assigned to the 6 households that had been involved in the long-pending case of land being taken from them for assignment to others. In the case of 195 households that had been lagging behind in the tilling of assigned land and had failed to pay off their loans promptly, some of their assigned land was taken back in order to assign 211 additional cong to the households that had capital, labor, and experience and wanted to have more land. This time 60 percent of the middle farmer households received more assigned land. In all eight collectives, no households were totally deprived of assigned land. Although this way of doing things looked like a way of eliminating trouble, it did satisfy the people's will and receive the monks' agreement and support; farmers felt assured as they were doing productive work and waiting for the end of the harvest before going back to the assigned land in the new location. The experience in settling the land disputes in Nguyet Lang B Hamlet was as follows: In the case of a hamlet having a large ethnic population, hamlet must be the unit to be used for rationally assigning land in terms of its location; at the same time, production collective must be the one for making adjustments in terms of areas of assigned land, in compliance with the party and state policies. This way the solution to the land disputes would surely remain a basic and long-lasting one.

Let us sternly and justly deal with those party members who have committed negative acts.

Many people share the opinion that part of the reasons behind the present land disputes is the fact that some cadres and party members in villages, hamlets, and collectives have committed negative acts having to do with land. The common ones are taking advantage of the cases of land assignments involving averages, raking and leveling, and beating deadlines to cheat, to acquire a lot of land and good land for members of their families; distributing more land than the right quotas to relatives; and giving orders to and oppressing the masses and thus creating anger among the people. It is not completely true, of course, to say that wherever cadres and party members have not committed any negative acts, the land disputes are less complex. In Binh Phu Village (Cang Long District), the land disputes were very bitter, but only one of 142 party members there has committed some negative acts having to do with land. It was a case of abuse of power on the part of the head of a collective who seized good land and stole from the land fund of the collective. He has recently been expelled from the party. In Chau Thanh District, Ba Viet, a permanent member of the District CPV Committee, pointed out that in the current phase of settling land disputes, all seven party members in the district who had committed negative acts having to do with land have been judged in front of the people and that severe disciplinary action has been taken against them. Another case of abuse of power involves the deputy secretary of the Hoa Minh Hamlet party chapter who refused to take his family's excess land to assign to other households and even took 6 more cong of land and gave to his son, who was not a registered resident in the locality. Recently disciplinary action has been taken against him, and all of the land involved has been taken back. All of the cases involving party members and collective cadres that the masses denounced have been asserted and brought to public criticisms, with those who committed the wrongdoings having admitted them in front of the people. On the other hand, in the course of settling the land disputes, quite a few cadres and party members have shown their virtues. Do Phu Huu (of Binh My Village in Cang Long District) has three dead heroes in his family, is himself a veteran cadre, and like his wife is a party member. Of the 16.5 cong his family owned, the collective assigned 7.5 cong to his household, with the rest of the land being ceded by his family to other households. At the conference of collective members, he had this to say: "In the past, we used to agree with the party and to share food and clothing with others; now if we take all of the land, how can the landless people earn a living?" He also tried to persuade many households that had excess land to do as he did.

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTs may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTs or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTs and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTs and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

21 FEB 89

